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Foreword
This thesis is the outcome of a long process, that started from an interest  for game theory and
formal models of legislatures on one side, and institutional theory on the other. I have always been
fascinated by the complex relations between cabinet and parliaments, and how they variate across
different political systems.
The first works on election timing, starting from the first games developed by Diermeier and
colleagues, up to Lupia and Strøm, impressed me significantly. It is thanks to this literature that I
was able to add a temporal dimension to my mental picture of parliamentary polities. At the same
time,  reading Joel  Watson's  manual  of game theory I  was extremely fascinated by the class of
bargaining  games,  especially  by  the  Rubinstein  non-cooperative  solution,  superior  to  Nash's
cooperative model, that I reluctantly excluded from the later versions of the formal model. It was by
observing the simplest models of bargaining between two players that I imagined the solution of my
future formal model. Its fundamental intuition lied in allowing the game's exit option through the
bargaining space, which could be split into sectors based on the current allocation of benefits, each
of which corresponded to a particular outcome of the game.
My goal was not just modeling a standard bargaining game with an exit option, but also to
include time in it. Formal models of multiparty systems produced before the present research didn't
describe the effects of the effects of time on the players' negotiations. The first attempts have been
frustrating. The first versions of the model, assuming continuous time, were rich of complex utility
equations and optimal stopping problems that were based on controverse assumptions on players'
preferences and added unnecessary weights to the model. At some point, I figured I had to choose
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between two unhappy choices: semplifying the model dramatically, making it overly simplistic, or
complicating it at the point of making it completely unmanageable? Reading Kayser's 2005 paper
on the determinants of opportunistic election timing in majoritarian systems was the turning point.
Kayser was inspired by the Bellman principle of optimality in order to describe the decision of a
government party to call a snap election. His continuation values represented and indespensable
example that allowed me to dramatically simplify the mathematics of my game.
Parallel  to  my  interest  in  election  timing,  I  was  captured  by  spatial  models  of  party
competition and policymaking. I always had a great passion for this topic since my undergraduate
studies of Anthony Down's economical theory of democracy. In particular, I was fascinated by the
literature on valence issues. I was especially impressed by Tim Groseclose's model. It proved to me
that it was possible to drastically improve downsian model with very few additional elements, and
correcting their most important flaws at the same. For long time I had a feeling that it was possible
to link thes two fundamental topics treated in the present thesis, opportunistic election timing and
valence issues in party competition, but I couldn't find a way to do it. Then, during my stay in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, I read the works of Luigi Curini and colleagues on the effect of valence shocks on
party competition.  His insights were the joining link that I was waiting for. I thus came to the
assumption that the popularity cost could be described as a negative shock in the valence capital of
a candidate, what I think represents the greatest contribution of my Ph.D.
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Chapter 1
The State of the Art of the Research on Election Timing
Elections are probably the most important events in the life of competitive regimes: their outcome
will  determine  what  political  forces  will  hold  office  positions.  In  most  of  parliamentary
democracies, governing parties can time the termination of cabinets in order to maximize gains such
as  popularity,  time  in  office,  and  policy  influence.  The  timing  of  cabinet  terminations  in
parliamentary systems is thus fundamental in order to understand how parliamentary democracies
work.
Cabinets can terminate because of the opportunistic, utilitarian action of a governing party
forecasting  future  policy  failures,  or,  in  case  of  minimum  winning  coalitions  or  minority
governments, following the failure of policy negotiations between the politically relevant actors. In
multiparty systems, typically characterized by a relatively high number of parties represented in
parliament  and  coalition  governments,  there  are  roughly  three  ways  in  which  a  cabinet  can
terminate. First, a government coalition can be substituted without having an anticipated election: a
new coalition of parties is found within the existing parliament, and substituting the previous one;
second, the current governing coalition is interrupted by the call of an early election; third, the
government terminates because the legislature reached its constitutionally mandated lenght. In any
of  these  cases,  the  termination  of  the  governing  coalition  has  extremely  important  political
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consequeces:  the  equilibrium  between  the  political  forces  can  change  dramatically,  producing
profound policy effects.
A cabinet  termination  event  is  not  just  an  important  political  event  per  se;  the  mere
possibility of having an anticipated termination influences the distribution of the bargaining weights
between governing and opposition parties, and consequently the outcome of the negotiations over
public policies, and the future of whole political careers. This thesis is an attempt to improve our
knowledge of these phenomena.
Preliminary Definitions
An  important  question  must  be  posed  at  the  very  beginning  of  this  inquiry:  what  should  be
considered as a cabinet termination? From 1942 to 1972, Australia has been governed by the same
governing coalition of  Liberal  and Country parties;  the party composition of the cabinet  never
changed, although four different prime ministers succeded one another.1 An other, probably more
controverse example is represented by the first three Moro cabinets in postwar Italy: between 1964
and 1968 three cabinets did succeed, all of them led by Aldo Moro from the Christian Democratic
party, all sustained by the same parliamentary majority.2 It was a succession of cabinets without
anticipated elections, nor a change in the prime minister or a different majority. To what extent the
cabinet  changed  in  these  cases?  Should  they  be  treated  differently?  In  what  cases  should  we
consider a cabinet as terminated?
1 This example is taken from Lijphart [1984].
2 The coalition was composed of: the Christian Democracy (DC), the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the
Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), and the Italian Republican Party (PRI).
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Several definitions have been provided in the literature; Lijphart [1984] provides a detailed
review. The one I will employ in this context is analogous to the one adopted by Browne et al.
[1984a, 1984b; 1986], that has become the standard definition in the literature. I assume a cabinet
terminates  when  one  of  the  following  three  events  happens.  First,  a  general  election  happens,
followed by the start  of a new legislature.  Since every moment governing parties  compare the
current legislature with an hypothetical legislature that would happen in case elections were held, it
is a reasonable assumption to hypothesize that being at the government right after the election is
preferable, all things equal, to being in charge at the last month of the legislature. Second, the prime
minister changes. The weight of a prime minister's preferences is such that the election of a new
leader entails a completaly different cabinet, often composed of a completely different staff. Third,
the party composition of the cabinet changes. The substitution of the current coalition with another
can happen for several reasons: strategic withdrawal of a party, expulsion of a member, resignation
of the whole cabinet.
Similar definitions have been used by Strøm [1985], King et al. [1990], Alt and King [1994],
Warwick [1994]. This excludes the definitions proposed in other works [Blondel 1968; Taylor and
Herman 1971;  de  Swaan  1973;  Warwick 1979],  in  which  a  cabinet  termination  is  assumed  to
happen whenever there is a change in the parties that provide external support too.
I  will  now  review  the  main  contribution  to  the  scientific  literature  on  election  timing,
making a preliminary distinction between empirical and theoretical works. The importance of this
distinction is due to the difference between the concepts of duration and durability of cabinets.
Political scientists are interested in studying to what extent a cabinet is more or less durable than
others, though only its actual duration can be observed and measured. This difference is of critical
importance; as Laver put: "The healthiest person in the world can be hit by a bus tomorrow, while
someone who is a total physical wreck can limp on to a ripe old age" [2003:24]. Formal models
provide theoretical accounts of cabinets' durability, while empirical models can only capture their
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effective durations.
Empirical Works
In the empirical litrature, the findings of King et al. [1990] marked an important divide. They have
been  the  firsts  in  applying  vent  history  techniques  to  the  study of  cabinet  termination.  Their
methodological  advancements  outperformed  the  preceding  statistical  models,  based  on  OLS
methodology.3 Duration  models  take  into  account  the  fact  that  the  termination  of  a  cabinet  is
essentially a stochastic process, and at the same time a function of a series of explanatory variables
that  researchers  individuate.  They are  more  consistent  with  the  theoretical  problem of  cabinet
termination, and allow for better treatments of left- and right-censored observations and the effects
of  time-varying  covariates.  Moreover,  though  the  same  results  can  be  achieved  through
mathematically  simpler  logit  models,  survival  analysis  allows  a  considerable  computational
efficiency [Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004]. Survival models
represent nowadays the standard tool for studying cabinet termination [see: Warwick and Easton
3 Before the application of survival models, the researches on cabinet termination have been divided in
two competing empirical approaches. On one side, the advocates of the "attributes" approach, that aimed
at the individuation of variables that could explain variations in the duration of cabinets [Dodd 1976;
Warwick 1979; Strøm 1985]. The duration of a cabinet is thus thought as a function of these covariates.
On the other side, the "events" approach, founded by Browne et al. [1984a, 1984b], was stochastic in
nature: it assumes a world of random events, described through Poisson models – that can potentially tear
down the cabinet, and that cannot be controlled by political actors [Cioffi-Revilla 1984; Browne et al.
1986]. For a more detailed review of this now dated debate, see Strøm et al. [1988] and Laver [2003].
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1992; Warwick 1992, 1994; Alt and King 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 2000; Diermeier
and Merlo 2000].
After the introduction of this family of models in the literature, a methodological diatribe
started about the shape of the hazards of cabinet termination. In King et al. [1990] the hazard rate of
the event "cabinet termination" was assumed as constant throughout the legislature – a conclusion
later confirmed by Alt and King [1994]. Their findings were at odds with the works of Warwick and
Easton [1992] and Warwick [1994], who estimated steepening hazards, raising as the time of the
legislature passes. The solution of this debate was largely provided by Dermeier and Stevenson
[1999]:  they reconciled  the  two different  positions  employing a  competing  risks  model,  which
allowed them to distinguish between two events: replacements, or the substitution of the current
governing coalition with a new one, without going to the polls; and dissolutions of the parliament
and call of anticipated elections. Their major finding was that the replacements hazard was flat,
while the dissolutions hazard was increasing through time.
Notwithstanting  the  significant  methodological  improvements  of  the  last  decades,  the
empirical literature is still  in need of a bold connection with a solid theory that could generate
testable hypothesis [Laver 2003:30]. The next section reviews the theoretical models that have been
developed in parallel with empirical works.
Theoretical Works
In order to depict the current state of the theoretical literature I will first start, following Lijphart
[1999],  by making an important  distinction between  Westminster  and  multiparty,  or  consensual
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models.
As  will  become  clear,  Westminster  models  reached  a  higher  level  of  mathematical
formalization, making these theories more refined than their multiparty counterparts. This is due to
at least two main differences between these parliamentary models of polity. First, since Westminster
models assume a single party or decision maker at the government, political scientists do not need
to  model  negotiations  over  public  policies  that  happen among  coalition  partners  in  consensual
systems;  the  presence  of  less  theoretical  constraints  allows  to  improve  the  decision  making
formalization to a significant extent. Second, they only need to account for one type of cabinet
termination: anticipated elections. The possibility of a replacement of the current coalition with a
new one from the same parliament,  without recurring to an early election,  ddoesn't  need to  be
modeles. Although it is always possible to have a cabinet termination due to a prime minister's
death or resignation, all the Westminster models developed up to now are not meant to describe it.
Balke [1900] published the first  important contribution in the field of formal models of
election  timing.  The object  of  interest  of  his  paper  is  modeling the  choice of  a  rational  prime
minister that weights costs and benefits of interrupting the current legislature in order to win office
positions for another full term.
Calling a snap election is defined as an optimal stopping problem, that solves:
V (t , pt)=maxτ Et {∫
t
ω
e−r(s−t)u(s , ps)ds + e
−r (ω−t )V(ω , pω)}
where V (t , pt) is the value of holding office at time t, given a popularity level of p t  ; τ is the
stopping time that maximizes the expected utility given a current popularity p t  ; t is the amount of
time in office since the last election. The first term represents the value of office holding until the
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next election; r is the rate of the exponential discount factor, and u(s, ps) is the instantaneous utility
of  being  at  the  government  given time s  and popularity level  ps.  The  following term V(m,  p)
represents the value calling an election. Intuitively, the legislature ends when the value of calling a
snap election exceeds the value of keeping the cabinet alive. W is the time an election ends. This
can  be  cused  by  three  possible  events:  the  government  reached  the  constitutionally  mandated
termination of the legislature (time T); the government voluntarilty calls an early election (time t);
the  government  is  forced  to  call  an  early  election  (time  η).  Given  these  insights,
ω = min (T , t ,η) .
In  Balke's  model,  the  government's  popularity  follows  a  stochastic  process,  and  cannot  be
systematically manipulated by the incumbent. Its form is defined as follows:
dp = α( t , p)dt + σ( t , p)dz
where α( t , p)dt is  the  deterministic  component  of  the  government's  popularity,  while
σ( t , p)dz is the random component, representing its volatility. dp is simplified so that it is in the
interval [0, 1], with 0 and 1 representing the bottom and the peak of popularity. Balke describes the
possibility of the government  being subject  to a  vote of no confidence by assuming that  when
popularity reaches 0, i.e. the lower bound of popularity, the incumbent is forced to call an election.
Terminating the legislature at time w has a value V (ω , pω) for the government, that is given by:
V (ω , pω) = G(pω)V(0,pω) − (1−G(pω))V(0,1−pω)
where G(pω) is  the  probability of  the government  winning the election  given popularity pw;
V (0, pω) is  the  value  of  winning the  election; V (0, 1−pω) is  the  value  that  the opposition
party receives if it wins the election.
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At this point, Balke defined an arbitrary threshold B(t) as the critical level of popularity at which the
value of holding office equals the expected value the government receives from facing an election.
The government's optimal choice of an election date, tau, is the first time pt >= B(t). Determining
the optimal time to call an election amounts to solving for the stopping boundary B(t). Using some
standard tools from the literature on stochastic methods [Friedman, 1976 and Malliaris and Brock,
1982], the optimal stopping problem posed by equation ( ) was solved, allowing for a set of results
that can be summarized as follows. First, governments tend to call an election when their popularity
is high and the constitutionally mandated election day approaches; they are also more likely to call
an election when their popularity drift is negative, in order to minimize popularity losses. Second,
elections are more likely to be called when the government's popularity is volatile; this is due to the
fact that a volatile popularity doesn't last for long time, making the government more willing to
seize the opportunity. Third, the government party is more likely to call a snap election if its time
discount  factors  are  low,  making  the  benefits  of  a  new  legislature  less  attractive.  Fourth,  a
government is more likely to call a snap election when the probabily of being defeated by a vote of
no confidence is high.
Balke's  optimal  stopping model  provided the most  refined mathematical  description of  the exit
option of the governing party, i.e. its expected value of exiting the existing legislature and going to
early elections. The exit option was described as a Brownian motion – more precisely as a Wiener
process, characterized by increasing variance, which is suitable for describing an incumbent's future
uncertainty.
His conclusions can be summarized as follows. First, governments tend to call an election
when their popularity is high and the constitutionally mandated election day approaches; they are
also more likely to call an election when their popularity drift is negative, in order to minimize
popularity losses. Second, elections are more likely to be called when the government's popularity
is volatile; this is due to the fact that a volatile popularity doesn't last for long time, making the
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government more willing to seize the opportunity. Third, the government party is more likely to call
a snap election if its time discount factors are low, making the benefits of a new legislature less
attractive. Fourth, a government is more likely to call a snap election when the probabily of being
defeated by a vote of no confidence is high.
Although Balke's model reached noteworthy levels of formalization, It must be noted that
this level of mathematical refinement is a double-edged sword: Brownian motion pushes the model
at  very  high  levels  of  formalization,  hardly  comprehensible  for  those  who  lack  a  basic
understanding of differential equations and optimization problems. More problematic is the way he
described the occurrence of termination events: he recurred to arbitrary popularity thresholds in
order to explain the termination events, either a volutary snap election or the occurrence of a no
confidence vote.  This last  case is  particularly problematic:  no strategic interaction among party
actions is modeled. The decision making process that might lead a party faction to tear down the
cabinet is not described; Balke just limits himself to assuming a popularity threshold (p, = 0), that
when reached causes a systematic termination of the legislature, without any further explanation.
Among this family of theories, the works of Smith [1996, 2003, 2004] represent probably
the  most  advanced  body of  research  in  the  field.  He  provided  the  best  integration  of  formal
modeling and empirical testing, though restricted to British governments alone. His signaling theory
models how the electorate reacts at the timing decisions of prime ministers in Westminster systems
[1996]. Smith's contributions are based on the following assumption: the better the future prospects
for the government,  the lower will  be the incentive for calling anticipated elections. If a prime
minister will keep being popular in the future, there will be no incentives for calling a snap election;
in order to maximize her time in office, she will just wait until the end of the legislature, and win
the following elections. Her incentives of calling an early election will be low even in case the
incumbent party is more popular than the opposition. Only a prime minister that forecasts future
policy failures has an interest in going to the polls anticipately; for these reasons voters should be
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skeptical about the reason when a snap election is called. Since competent governments wait longer
before  calling  early  elections,  their  timing  represents  a  signal  for  the  electorate  about  the
government's  future performances.  Once an election is  called earlier  than expected,  a Bayesian
electorate  updates  its  beliefs  about  the incumbent's  capacities  of  running the economy and the
country. Calling a snap election always determines a popularity loss for the incumbent. A rational
prime minister that anticipates a deterioration of the economy thus needs to choose between calling
an early election and paying the popularity cost, or waiting for the decline to happen.
Smith's theory allowed also for the analysis of the electoral cost the governing party faces
calling early elections; he was the first in finding empirical evidence of the fact that some voters
punish prime ministers for their opportunistic election timing [2003, 2004]. As it will be shown
below, this finding is extremely important for the purposes of the present thesis.
Another important model is the one proposed by Kayser [2005], that linked opportunistic
cabinet termination with the literature on political-economic cycles. In his model, election timing is
a problem of optimization under uncertainty, to be analyzed using dynamic programming tools.4
More  specifically,  election  timing  is  described  as  an  optimal  stopping  problem,  based  on  few
assumptions: voters have no memory of previous periods; the government’s reelection probability,
p, in each period t  {1, 2, 3, . . . , τ}, is strictly increasing in a random state variable∈
μ ~Uniform[1− 12 ζ , 1+ 12 ζ ]
4 Dynamic programming is a method that is meant to solve optimization problems involving a sequence of
decisions based on the Bellman principle of optimality [Bellman 1957]. It determines, for each decision,
subproblems that can be solved following a similar, recursive pattern, such that an optimal solution of the
original problem can be found from optimal solutions of subproblems [Lew and Mauch 2007]. 
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where ζ represents the density. It is the case of a discrete-time Markov process, where each draw of
μt is independent of others. Governments choose the optimal timing of elections waiting until the
highest μt that they believe will occur during the legislature. Office utility is constant over time.
In the set of {1, …, τ-1} periods of the game, i.e.: all except the last one, the government’s expected
value for the subsequent period Et(μt+1) equals the expected value of the random variable μ, i.e., one.
The expected state continuing from t to t +1  is the value of playing an optimal strategy at t, i.e., the
average expected state from t’s two possible outcomes over all possible values of μ:
U (t) = maxt {continue , if μt<E t(μt+1)call , if μt>E t(μt+1)
Each period in office the government gains a payoff, defined as an ego rent R.
The rational office-seeking incumbent continues in office until the expected utility of calling an
election exceeds the expected utility of continuing in office. The respective continuation value λ is
represented as:
λ = e−δ(τ−t )p(E(μt+1)) τR + (τ−t)R
where the first term represents the expected value of calling an early election, i.e.: the product of the
reelection probability generated by the expected future state p(E (μt+1)) and the utility of a new
term in  office,  τR,  appropriately  time  discounted.  The  second  term in  the  equation,  (τ  −  t)R,
captures  the remaining utility in  the current  term in office and shrinks  as the term progresses,
providing a diminishing incentive to forgo favorable election opportunities. τ is the maximum term
length in periods and t represents the current period.
The prime minister compares the continuation value just exposed with the expected utility of calling
11
a snap election, described as
n t = p(μt)τR
which represents  the  maximum length  of  a  new,  full  term,  weighted  by the  current  reelection
probability p(μt) .
In the remaining part of the paper, Kayser shows how constructing  p  as a linear combination in
which past reelection standing is combined with new events in proportion to the strength of voter
memory does not change the model’s fundamentals. A higher voter memory reduces the volatility of
government  reelection  probabilities  and  consequently  lowers  the  likelihood  of  early  elections.
Voters' decision making process are modeled more explicitly, with respect to economic welfare.
Their  choices  depend  from a  government  provision  of  public  goods,  described  by  a  function
gt=zt(Ty+st) , including the tax rate T, income y, aggregate two-period economic shocs, and a
hidden tax st that shifts resources from future to the present, improving current period welfare at the
cost of the equivalent amount plus negative economic distortions, V(s), in the subsequent period
[:21].
Manipulating  the  economy right  before  a  general  election  will  cause  a  postelection  economic
downturn  captured  by lower  government  revenue,  lower  public  goods  provision,  and  negative
distortionary effects. The goal of a self interested government is thus finding a trade off between
voter welfare and reelection probability.
Comparative statics then suggest: first, that opportunistic election timing represents a substitute for
economic manipulation; second, that in countries with more volatile economies governments are
more prone to calling eraly election opportunistically and less inclined to economic manipulation;
third, that longer legislatures make snap elections and economic manipulation more likely; fourth,
that  higher  office  utility  decreases  the  likelihood  of  election  timing,  but  increases  economic
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manipulation [:19].
Kayser's model is mathematically very efficient: he could greatly simplify it recurring to dynamic
programming techinques in the description of the governing party's  utility,  that  allowed for the
solution of a complex problem by breaking it into simpler subproblems; the model could be reduced
to an optimal choice function describing the passage from a stage to another of the game. Although
sacrificing the continuous nature of time doesn't represent a great theoretical cost, its description of
the exit option as a purely stochastic process is not fully convincing: it is significantly more simple
than a Brownian motion but it lacks in realism. Parties keep producing forecasts about the future
developments of their popularity and the economy, and a purely stochastic process is not able to
capture these dynamics. However, Kayser's model has two important merits: he introduced dynamic
programming tools  in  the  literature  on  cabinet  termination,  and he  was  able,  as  Smith  did,  to
connect this literature to the topics of political-economic cycles.5
As I noted above, describing the government as a unitary actor allowed Westminster models
to reach considerable levels of mathematical formalization. The relative simplicity of single actor
models allowed for significant theoretical refinements of the decision making process, and more
satisfying accounts of the effect of time on the actors' choices. Multiparty systems are harder to
describe. The reason behind this difficulty is the higher complexity of multiparty competition: since
consensual systems are often governed by coalition of parties, it is necessay to describe not just the
choice of incumbents to keep the government alive or not, but also the negotiations over public
policies among them, and their  effects on the likelihood of cabinet termination. The bargaining
game between coalition parties is thus a complex and variegated phenomenon, that is crucial in
order to understand cabinet termination in consensual democracies.
5 A  related  research  published  by  Kayser  [2006]  treated  the  effects  of  export  expansions  and
internationally transmitted economic cycles on the timing of elections.
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The firsts who tried to formalize this process have been Lupia and Strøm [1995], in probably
the most  relevant  game-theoretic  work produced on cabinet  termination in  consensual  systems.
Their model represents the theoretical starting point for the study of this form of polities.
Lupia and Strøm developed a model to explain the causes of cabinet termination in a parliamentary
polity characterized by coalition governments and a parliament provided with dissolution powers. It
consists of a three-party game: two coalition partners and an opposition party. All the players share
a common knowledge.
The  game  is  assumed  to  begin  at  some  point  during  a  legislature,  after  a  potentially  critical
popularity shock, signaled by a reliable poll,  is  happened. This game allows for three possible
outcomes: a continuation of the existing coalition, its substitution with a new one, or a premature
dissolution of the legislature and the call of new election.
The players' utilities are composed of several parameters, that are determined exogenous to (prior
to) the play of this game: si represents the subjective value to party i of the seats that it controls,
described as as equivalent to i's parliamentary seat shares; ci represent party i's share of power in the
governing coalition, i.e. the size of the pie slice that party i receives [:652]; g j
i is the value to
party i of being in a coalition with party j. A combination of these given parameters represents the
utility, for a governing party, of being at current government: si+(ci×gJ) .
This value is compared with bi , i.e. the expected utility of a period 1 election to party i. This
parameter represents all of the game-relevant information about party i's postelection well-being.
Calling  a  snap  election  comes  with  opportunity  costs,  defined  as  the  policy-making  and  rent
collection  opportunities  that  a  party  looses;  and  transaction  costs,  defined  as  election-related
intraparty negotiation, campaigning and electioneering. A party's opportunity costs are defined as
equal  to  the  current  governing  utility si+(ci×g j
i) , while E i represents  the  election-related
transaction costs. Party i expects thus a period 2 utility equal to bi – E j , from a period 1 election.
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Once  the  game  starts,  i.e.  the  popularity  shock  is  realized,  each  incumbent  party  can  offer  a
reallocation of power to another party, either the current coalition partner ot the opposition party. If
the party to whom the offer is made accepts the offer the game ends, and period 2 payoffs are
determined according to the new distribution. In case the offer is rejected, the second party can
make an offer that could lead to an alternative allocation of benefits. In case none of the offers are
accepted, then a no confidence motion is called. In other words, a no confidence vote happens either
when no offer is accepted, or a parliamentary majority wants such a vote. Once the vote is held, the
majority of  MPs are assumed to vote 'no'  and the  parliament  is  dissolved,  leading to  an  early
election. If the vote is held, and parties controlling a majority of seats vote no, then parliament is
dissolved, new elections are held, and the game ends.
Starting  a  negotiation  on  public  policies  involves  a  transactions  cost K i , which  is  meant  to
capture the effort required to reach an agreement with party members and constituents. 
A singular  feature  of  this  model  is  the  assumption  of  parties'  a priori preference  for  political
stability. The option of calling a snap election is never available as an incumbent's first choice.
Instead, it is always described as a consequence of a negotiation failure.
The model's results have been showed as follows. They established a set of conditions:
Condition  A. There is a majority that prefers an election to leaving the governing coalition
exactly as it was. 
Condition B. All offering parties prefer an election to the best acceptable offer they can
make. 
Condition C. No offering party prefers the best acceptable offer it can make to leaving the
governing coalition exactly as it was. 
That lead to the three following theorems:
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Theorem 1. The event leads to a dissolution if and only if A and B are true.
Theorem 2. The status quo is maintained if and only if A is false and C is true.
Theorem 3. The event leads to a nonelectoral redistribution of power if and only if either (1)
A is true and B is false or (2) A and C are false [:655-6].
The conclusion is that exogenous events, such as a popularity shock, can affect incumbent parties'
negotiation on public policies. The importance of the study of critical events is strongly underlined.
In legislatures vested with dismissal and dissolution powers, expected electoral impact is often what
makes a political event "critical" to cabinet stability [:659].
One of the merits  of the Lupia and Strøm's  model  is  that they have been the first  who
modelized  multiparty systems,  describing the  possibility of  a  termination of  the  cabinet  that  is
alternative to anticipated elections. Moreover, Lupia and Strøm have been the firsts who provided a
theoretical account of the effect of electoral expectations on the outcome of the negotiation over
public policies, and consequently on the probability of cabinet termination. Lupia Strøm found out
that the anticipation of future electoral gains by the governing parties is just one of several causes of
termination. Because of the complexity of the political competition in consensual systems, it is not
possible to limit explanations of cabinet terminations to the forecast of future policy failures [Smith
2003, 2004], or of future electoral gains [Grofman and van Rozendaal 1994]. Lupia and Strøm have
shown that coalition governments can terminate because of a policy negotiation failure, and that the
probability that an opinion poll shock determines a cabinet termination grows as the constitutionally
mandated termination of the legislature is closes.
Multiparty models did not significantly improve since Lupia and Strøm. The latest studies
on election timing in multiparty systems from Strøm et al. [2008] simply makes reference to their
model. Later contibutions in formal modeling focused on the recurrence to the vote of confidence
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procedures  [Huber  1996],  and how different  institutional  settings  affect  the  bargaining process
among coalition parties [Huber and McCarty 2001; Strøm and Swindle 2002]. The main limit of
this class of models is that they are all a-temporal: they assume a shock happened at some point in
the legislature, and that actors choose consequently; time is not modeled as in their majoritarian
counterparts [Balke 1990; Kayser 2005].
In a series of papers, Diermeier and colleagues [Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Diermeier
and  Stevenson  2000;  Diermeier  and  Merlo  2000]  tried  to  solve  this  problem.  Diermeier  and
Feddersen modeled time in a legislature, but the goal of their model was to explain differences
between political  systems with  vote  of  confidence  procedures,  and systems devoid  of  it.  They
explained how a cabinet could lose its confidence in the parliament, but they didn't try to describe
the  case  of  a  governing  party  causing  a  voluntary  termination  of  the  cabinet.  The  model  of
Diermeier and Stevenson was just the stochastic version of the Lupia-Strøm model. Diermeier and
Merlo solved the "time problem" only partially, developing a model in two stages, which the first
represents the process of cabinet formation, that will not be treated in this study, and the second
represents the whole legislature, reduced to a vote of confidence over a policy agreement.6 They
achieved interesting conclusions about coalition theory, explaining the emergence of different kinds
of governing coalitions (minority, minimal winning, oversized) but at the cost of oversimplifying
the policymaking process.
The multiparty models exposed up to now are thus in a paradoxical state: they are theories
of election timing in which time is (almost) non existent. These models fail to provide a formal
description  of  the  effects  of  time  over  the  governing  parties'  choices,  neglecting  the  obvious
assumption that for a governing party giving up the last years of legislature is not like giving up the
last months. The empirical findings of Diemeier and Stevenson [1999] on the shape of the hazards
of cabinet dissolutions tell us that political scientists should not be satisfied with the state of the art
6 The  same  pattern  was  followed  by  Baron  [1998],  based  on  a  preliminary  version  of  their  model
[Diermeier and Feddersen 1996].
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of consensual models. Up to this point, the literature forces the reader to make a choice: a model
with a single,  unitary actor that can effectively describe the effect of time on the likelihood of
cabinet termination, or a consensual model able to describe the bargaining interaction that is going
on in most of European parliamentary democracies, but devoid of an adequate description of the
effects of time.
In addition, consensual models present four additional, common problems. First, they are
not spatial models. Even those presented as spatial models [Diermeier and Merlo 2000] actually
work as divide-the-dollar games; a good integration of theories of cabinet termination with spatial
models of policymaking is fundamental for an advancement in both fields, since the two are strictly
connected. A second, striking feature is the excessive simplicity of the policy negotiations among
coalition partners: in all the models exposed, bargaining among players is represented as a finite,
short sequence of offers and counteroffers; this keeps these models as simple as unrealistic. Finite-
horizon models suffer of two main limitations: their solution and the final payoffs for each player
depend from the lenght of the game; and they assume that once the last stage of the game is reached
parties are no more allowed to counter a policy offer, but only to accept or reject it [Fudenberg and
Tirole 1991]. Third, an important aspect of election timing that current theories avoided almost
completely is the electoral cost, to be expressed in terms of votes, that a party faces after causing
anticipated elections. Smith represents an exception to this lack of attention, but he only checked
the existence of this effect in an empirical model. A theory of how this cost happens, and what
factors determine its magnitude, is completely lacking in political science. Moreover, the available
empirical evidence is contradictory: Blais et al. [2004] found no significant effect of this cost in
their analysis of the 2000 Canadian election. The lack of treatment of this electoral cost is striking,
since I assume it being the main deterrent for a party from triggering early elections. Finally, with
reference  to  the  previous  paragraph,  existing  theoretical  models  have  not  been  subjected  to
systematic empirical testing [Laver 2003:38]; without a stronger link between theory and empirical
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research, none of them will be able to significantly improve.
The sole, partial exception to the general lack of empirical treatment is represented by the
work of Diermeier and Stevenson [2000], that succesfully tested the raising hazards assumption of
the  Lupia-Strøm model  using  competing  risks  survival  analysis.  It  must  be  noted  though,  that
Diermeier and Stevenson tested only that aspect of the Lupia-Strøm model.  The "reliable poll"
assumption, i.e. the hypothesis that the likelihood of cabinet termination can be explained through
variations in parties'  electoral expectations,  has never been subject to empirical testing.  In fact,
Diermeier and Stevenson's research, as all the ones exposed above, limit themselves to "static" tests:
for  each  cabinet,  they record  its  time  lenght  while  controlling  for  several  covariates  capturing
institutional and political effects, and then apply event history methodology. The role of electoral
expectations, by definition mutable and constantly changing, cannot be captured with these overly
simplistic methods.
I will now expose the structure of the present dissertation, and point out what improvements
it will bring to this branch of the political science literature.
Structure of the Dissertation
I will start chapter 2 raising a preliminary question that will be fundamental for the development of
my thesis, that can be summarized by the following question: do voters punish prime ministers for
the calling anticipated elections? It is well known that in parliamentary systems, governing leaders
time elections in order to maximize future benefits, but how voters reacts to this opportunistic move
is  still  an  open  question.  As  I  will  show,  the  scarce  evidence  available  reached  contradictory
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conclusions  [Smith  2003,  2004;  Blais  et  al.  2004].  My research will  provide a  solution to  the
existing debate, showing that all the findings provided up to now represent specific cases of a more
general  phenomenon.  For  the  first  time  in  the  literature,  I  will  link  the  research  on  cabinet
termination with the research on valence issues in party competition. I will individuate what factors
are more likely to influence the magnitude of the popularity cost of calling an early election, while
controlling for several covariates.
The core of my thesis is represented by the game-theoretic model that will be depicted in
chapter  3.  On the basis  of the Lupia and Strøm's model,  I  will  develop a  three players  game,
representing two coalition parties and an opposition party, that play through a legislature defined as
a series of discrete steps. In each stage of the game, each governing player observes her electoral
expectations,  and  chooses  between  starting  a  negotiation  on  public  policies  with  other  cabinet
parties,  negotiating  with  the  opposition  party  on  the  creation  of  a  new  cabinet,  and  causing
anticipated  elections.  With  respect  to  preexisting  literature,  my  game  will  show  a  series  of
improvements.
First, the game is no more of a static type: I will be able to introduce time in the model and
account for its effects on the outcome of players' negotiations. To keep the model as simple as
possible, I followed the example of Kayser [2005] and characterized it as a sequence of descrete
steps. Second, it introduces spatial considerations, such as the ideological location of the players
and their coalition opportunities. It constitutes a first attempt to link the literature on election timing
with the literature on spatial theory of party competition and policymaking. Third, I developed a
theoretical explanation of the popularity cost of calling a snap election, linking for the first time the
literature on election timing with valence models of party competition.
Later in the chapter, I will report empirical testing of the fundamental assumptions of my
model. Some of them, while already popular in the literature, have received little-to-no empirical
testing.  I  will  thus  propose  the  following  two  contributions.  First,  since  blackmailing  among
20
coalition partners is based on the credible threat represented by the exit option, I will explain the
likelihood of cabinet termination using voting intention trends, providing evidence in favor of the
assumption that  cabinet  termination  can be  understood by looking at  the  electoral  expectations
shared  by parties,  as  measured  by opinion  polls.  Second,  by  using  measures  based  on  voting
intention trends from four European consensual democracies, covering more than fifty years of
parliamentary politics,  I  will  run parametric and semiparametric survival regressions with time-
varying  covariates. Results will show that variations in the exit option for the governing parties
efficiently explain the likelihood of cabinet termination. On consensual democracies, this kind of
test has never been conducted before.
Chapter 4 will treat a corollary research.  If it is possible to employ voting intention trends in order
to explain the likelihood of cabinet termination, in the same way it must be possible, I argue, to use
the same data to understand ministerial duration. In fact, the firing, the substraction or increase in a
minister's policy prerogatives can be described, under the lenses of the bargaining theory exposed in
Chapter 3, as an exchange currency in the power game among coalition parties. Using the same
survival  analysis  techinques,  I  will  show  how  imbalances  in  incumbent  parties'  popularity  is
associated with more frequent redistributions of power withing the governing coalition. Even in this
case,  my  empirial  models  will  include  time-varying  covariates,  unlike  previous  researches,
producing an empirical contribution to the literature of ministerial duration.
A final chapter will conclude the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
The Popularity Cost of Manipulative Election Timing.
A Valence Theory.
In most parliamentary systems, elections dates are not fixed7.  Since government leaders are not
directly elected by voters, but nominated by the parliament, the survival of the cabinet depends on
it.  During  the  course  of  a  legislature,  the  parties  that  control  the  cabinet  can  choose,  thus,  to
withdraw their support causing its termination and opening a government crisis, an event that often
leads to the call of anticipated elections. This can be done in several ways. In some systems, such as
the  United  Kingdom,  where  the  head  of  the  State  is  not  partisan  and  the  prime  minister  has
unilateral dissolution powers, incumbent party leaders enjoy great freedom in choosing the date of
elections.  In  other  systems,  such  as  Austria,  charachterized  by  a  more  complex  political
competition, weaker prime ministers, and strong dissolution powers in the hands of a partisan head
of the State, a party at the government (or one that provides external support, as in the case of
minority governments) can influence the timing of elections. The leader of a party in control of
some ministerial positions can choose, for example, to withdraw its ministers anytime, forcing the
country to go through a government crisis. If alternative governing coalitions are not available, or
7 This specification has to be made in order to exclude those countries, such as Norway and post 1975 Sweden, in
which the dates of elections are fixed in time. In these countries,  general elections must be held at  fixed time
intervals that are determined by the constitusion itself, independently from potential government crises.
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they do not represent a viable choice, that crisis is likely to lead to early elections. In more radical
cases, the party can align against the government when a confidence motion is attached to a bill
voted in the parliament, or even to propose a no confidence motion and tear down the cabinet.
It can be inferred that in the vast majority of parliamentary systems, a government party has
the possibility of determining, or at least influencing, the timing of elections. A prime minister who
is forecasting a future economic crisis might be led to call a snap election in order to increase the
chances of reelection [Smith 2003, 2004]. Unpopular incumbents might choose to do it in order to
minimize  popularity  loss,  while  favored  ones  might  take  advantage  of  temporary  peaks  of
popularity. The peculiar features of parliamentary polities outlined here provide incumbent party
leaders and prime ministers with a significant advantage. The timing of elections can be choosen or
influenced in order to maximize expected future benefits, such as a higher popularity, a longer stay
in office, or a greater influence on policymaking.
However, these powers come with a cost for governing parties: the strategic timing of an
election represents a manipulative act that might disappoint at least a fraction of the electorate. In
voters' eyes, calling a snap election in order to maximize expected future gains does not correspond
to how elected officials should behave in order to represent interests of the nation. Government
leaders calling an early election are accused of giving precedence to their own personal gains, rather
than  representing  their  constituency  or  running  the  country  responsibly.  Once  at  the  polls,
disappointed  supporters  of  a  government  party might  choose to  punish the  incuments  for  their
opportunistic choices. How many votes a governing party lose after a snap election has been called?
This question represents the central  theme of the present paper.  Surprisingly,  there is a lack of
relevant studies on the topic. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is impossible to fully understand
how the timing of elections in parliamentary systems works without an adequate description of this
cost.
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will briefly review the available
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literature  produced  on  the  topic,  a  report  on  the  contrasting  conclusions  reached  by  different
scholars. Second, I will provide a theretical explanation of the popularity cost of calling a snap
election, linking, for the first time in political science, the literature on cabinet termination with that
on valence issues in spatial models of party competition. Third, I will test a set of hypotheses that
can be deduced from this theoretical model using the first comparative dataset, providing empirical
support for them. Fourth, on the basis of evidence presented, I will explain why past researches
reached different conclusions about the manitude of this cost.  A commentary will  conclude the
paper.
Contradictory Evidence from Previous Works
There are a few, noteworthy exceptions to the general lack of interest towards this topic. The first is
a collection of works on election timing produced by Smith [1996, 2003, 2004], whose main goal
was to explain the likelihood of cabinet termination in the United Kingdom.8 Smith proposed an
informational  theory that was able  to  link election timing,  economic performance and electoral
outcomes.  The game theoretic  model  he developed [Smith 1996] is  based on an informational
asymmetry between government  leaders  and voters.  If  government  leaders  can  forecast  future,
potential economic declines better than others, it follows that snap elections have to be called by
British prime ministers in anticipation of an economic downturn. The greater the expected decline,
the greater the probability that the prime minister will call an early election.
8 Although the insights it provided have been tested on British governments only [Smith 2003, 2004], his
results  might  be  extended  to  the  totality  of  majoritarian  parliamentary  system.  The  definition  of
majoritarian and consensual systems is based on Lijphart [1999].
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Anticipating the elections, however, comes with a cost. This opportunistic action reveals the
prime minister's negative expectations about the future to the electorate. The timing of an election
informs voters about what conditions they should expect in the near future, leading them to adjust
their  appraisal  for the government.  As it  was provocatively concluded by Smith: all  else  being
equal,  early elections  are  fought  between  incompetent  incumbents  and ill-prepared  challengers
[2003:401].  All  of his predictions have been tested in following works [2003, 2004],  where he
employed a set of linear OLS regressions in order to describe the two-party change in support for
the government after an election was announced. Its results suggest that the opportunistic timing of
an election affects the electorate's support of the incumbent party. Smith's empirical research [2003,
2004]  represents  the  first  works  where  the  negative  reaction  of  the  electorate  to  opportunistic
election timing was observed and estimated.
But the evidence on the existence of that popularity cost is not at all unanimous. Blais et al.
[2004]  challenged  the  admittedly  controversial  assumption  that  is  central  to  Smith's  theory,
according to which voters are able to interpret the decision to call an anticipated election as a signal
of the government's incompetence, and update their beliefs about the incumbent candidate. Their
research consists of a deep and thorough analysis of how Canadian voters reacted to the decision of
prime minister Chrétien, leader of the Liberal party of Canada, to call an early election in 2000.9
The goal of their analysis was to check whether voters understood the manipulative nature of the
prime minister's  choice,  denounced by both the media and the opposition,  and would therefore
punish him at the polls or not [:309-310]. From their analysis it results that Chrétien's decision to
call a snap election produced a weak indignation effect. Very few, informed voters choose to punish
Chrétien's Liberal party, which suffered a vote loss that was estimated around one percentage point.
Their conclusions are thus opposite to the ones reached by Smith: only a few voters punish prime
ministers for calling a snap election, though, as  the authors themselves admitted,  it  is not clear
whether the 2000 Canadian election represents an exceptional case or not [:317]. Again, the issue
9 Data have been taken from the 2000 Canadian Election Study (CES).
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deserves further study.
What conclusions can be drawn from this review of the existing literature? Both studies are
very different in their aims and methodology, and have been conducted on different countries and
on different time intervals. The evidence provided by Blais et al. focuses on one election, with deep
and thorough analysis  allowing for  limited generalization.  At  the same time,  Smith provides  a
broader look of the topic, but limited to the United Kingdom alone. Moreover, the OLS regressions
from which his conclusions about the existence of the popularity cost of calling a snap election have
been taken have been run on extremely small datasets, including 13 to 14 observations [2003:414].
Available  empirical  evidence  is  thus  relatively scarce  and no comparative  work  has  ever  been
produced before the study herein. Moreover, no research has ever tried to explain the discrepancy
between the results reached by different scholars. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap.
In the next section, I will propose a simple formal model providing a theoretical explanation
of the extent of the popularity cost of calling a snap election. In order to do that, it is necessary to
link this problem to the literature on valence issues in party competition. The argument is that the
conclusions provided by Smith [2003, 2004] and Blais et al. [2004] do not exclude each other, but
rather represent specific cases of a more general and variegated phenomenon. From the combination
of theoretical insights and empirical evidence, it will be possible to identify a set of factors that are
likely to influence the magnitude of the popularity cost of calling an early election, and explain why
in the 2000 Canadian case this cost was minimal.
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A Valence Theory of the Popularity Cost
Let us assume a simple downsian model [Downs 1954], where two parties, whose proposed policies
are labeled L and R, compete on a single-dimensional policy space on which a risk averse electorate
is uniformly distributed. The assumption of proximity voting shapes the actors' preferences: each
voter will choose the candidate who minimizes the distance from their preferred policy.10 If, from
this bare model, we try to describe the popularity shock that a prime minister or an incumbent party
suffers after the calling a snap election, there would be dubious assumptions over the nature of
voters' preferences. What makes a simple Downsian model incompatible with the description of the
phenomenon of voters punishing an incumbent for calling a snap election is  the assumption of
proximity voting. In such a theoretical framework, in which electors cast their ballots based on the
candidates' ideological distance from their ideal policies, why would they change voting preferences
after a prime minister chooses to call a snap election? Perhaps the opportunistic decisions taken by
government leaders produce alterations in the distribution of voters' ideal points? Did those who
choose to punish the prime minister after taking an opportunistic action actually change their ideas
about politics and society? These predictions seem hard to defend. In order to provide a satisfying
theoretical account of the negative reaction of the electorate that follows the call of a snap election,
simple Downsian models need to be enhanced. The present paper makes the argument that what
makes some voters change their vote is a valence cost the prime minister pays after an opportunistic
election call.
The term valence issues was introduced by Stokes [1963], in an important article in which
he provided a sharp critique of the basic assumptions of Anthony Downs' spatial theory [1954].
According to Stokes, every candidate should be described by either policy or positional issues, and
valence issues. On the former, candidates are divided and spread along one ore more ideological
10 In this simple proximity voting model an indifferent voter is assumed to either pick a candidate randomly
or to abstain, as in Downs [1954].
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axes; on valence issues instead, no spatial competition happens. All candidates and electors can be
thought as grouped on the same ideal point, i.e.: they all share the same preferences. Voters have
different views on the degree of the state's control of the economy, on civil rights and immigration,
but there is an assumption that a highly educated candidate is preferable than a poorly educated one
and that honest politicians are better than "rascals". As several works have shown [Ansolabehere
and Snyder 2000; Groseclose 2001; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2009; Clark 2009; Serra
2010] the effect of valence issues plays a crucial role in order to explain political competition and a
party's chances of winning.11
From  the  framework  of  a  spatial  voting  model,  how  can  valence  issues  explain  the
magnitude of the electoral cost of calling a snap election? The answer to this question constitutes
the central theoretical argument of the present study:  calling an early election involves a valence
cost for an incumbent party or prime minister. Voters don't have high esteem for those showing
clearly opportunistic intentions, and the fact that a party looses some votes after calling a snap
election doesn't mean that its electorate has suddenly changed political views. Such a downturn in
the citizens' trust towards selfish, opportunistic politicians can be expressed in a reduction in their
valence capital.  In a valence model, voters choose the their preferred party on the basis of two
elements:  their  ideological  distance  from the  different  candidates,  and  their  respective  valence
capital.
Given the assumptions formulated above, it is possible to define a utility function for each elector E
in the following way:
11 It has to be said that, notwithstanding its relevance in the literature on party competition, this body of research
didn't reach unanimous results. The formal models provided by Groseclose [2001] and Serra [2010], for example,
lead to opposite predictions on the strategic location of parties provided with differing valence capitals. All of these
studies,  though,  have showed the impressive improvements on the spatial  theory of  party competition that  the
incorporation of valence issues has provided, and how a difference in the valence capitals owned by competing
candidates allows political scientists to explain why Downsian convergence is not observed in the empirical world.
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uE = – (xE – xP)2 + vP , (2.1)
where xE represents an elector's ideal point, xP is the public policy adopted by an elected candidate
P, and vP represents her respective valence capital.12 The simple shape of this utility function allows
us to describe, with very few elements, how voters choose their candidate weighing ideological
proximity on one side, and virtues such as honesty and competence on the other.
Figure 2.1. Variations in the size of the Stokes region in a two-party legislature.
2.1a 2,1b
Figure 2.1 represents the case of a two party legislature in which a party A, running for office aginst
a competitor B, suffers an ε valence shock, and how the electorate reacts to it.  For risk-averse
voters, the distance between two competing parties influences the impact of an ε valence shock on
their voting choices.  Following Groseclose [2001]:
When one candidate, say [A], is superior on valence characteristics, it is possible for a voter to prefer
[B]'s policy more yet vote for [A]. I call such voters Stokes voters, and I define the Stokes region as
the set of ideal points that represent Stokes voters [:864-865; italics in the original].
12 Analogous models, though with different utility structures, can be found in Groseclose [2001] and Curini [2015].
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The Stokes region can be thus thought as the set of voters that, because of a valence differential,
choose a certain candidate while being ideologically closer to another one. In Figures 2.1, the black
segments on the x-axes represent the change in size of the Stokes region following an ε valence
shock; its size represents the amount of votes that are lost by party A, to the advantage of party B.
The  difference  between  Figures  2.1a  and  2.1b  lies  in  the  ideological  distance  between  the
candidates: when they are relatively distant, the change in the Stokes region is relatively small;
when instead the distance between the two parties shrinks, the amount of votes lost by candidate A
grows considerably. For a voter located in the [A, B] interval, the cost of changing voting choice is
higher when the parties are distant, while it is comparatively lower when an ideologically similar
competitor is available. It follows that the importance of valence issues for each competing party
increases as their ideological distance diminishes [Groseclose 2001; Curini 2015]. When parties are
ideologically  cohesive,  a  small  variation  in  the  valence  capital  of  a  candidate  can  change  the
outcome of an election.
Figure 2.2. Effects of a negative valence shock in a multiparty legislature.
2.2a. 2.2b.
For unidimensional models of multiparty systems, the same conclusions can be drawn, with each
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party on the ideological spectrum worrying about the distance between their adjacent parties [Curini
2015:170-176]. This case is represented in Figure 2.2.
This argument can be easily generalized: assuming a valence shock happened for party A, it  is
possible to individuate the change in size of the Stokes region, ΔA, in the following way:
ΔA= ϵ2|A−B| (2.2)
A demonstration showing the origins of this formula is available in Appendix A. As shown in Figure
2.3, the cost of a negative valence shock rises exponentially as A approaches B, and decreases at the
same pace beyond that point.
Figure 2.3. Effects of a negative valence shock as the parties' ideological distance changes. 
Note: The parameter values used for this plot are the same used for Figure 2.1; R = 4; ε = 1.8.
The variation in the size of the Stokes region that follows a negative valence shock represents a
good theoretical description of the popularity cost an incumbent pays by making choices, such as
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calling a snap election, that are perceived by the electorate as self-interested and manipulative. This
makes possible to formulate some predictions on the magnitude of this cost.
Predictions
Given the insights provided by the valence models of spatial competition previously mentioned
above, it is possible to formulate the central hypothesis of this paper: if we assume that a prime
minister that calls a snap election will be considered opportunistic by the electorate, causing a loss
in her valence capital, then it follows that the closer competing candidates are to each other, the
more calling a snap election will be costly, in terms of popularity and votes, for a governing party.
In more formal terms, the central hypothesis of this paper can be stated in the following way:
(H2.1)  The popularity  cost  of  opportunistic  election  timing is  higher  as  the  ideological
distance between parties shrinks.
The simple formal model exposed above shows that when a shock in an incumbent's valence capital
happens, it translates into a loss of electoral support, which varies on the basis of the ideological
distance between adjacent competitors. But what determines the magnitude of the valence shock in
first place? My hypothesis is that voters consider as worthy of punishment the opportunistic act of
calling  a  snap  election.  If,  as  Blais  et  al.  [2004]  claimed,  a  most  of  the  voters  struggle  in
distinguishing between a regular election and one that was anticipated opportunistically, then it can
be assumed that the popularity shock for the incumbent party that tears the government down is
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greater the more an election is called away from the constitutionally mandated election day. In other
words, the more an election is called ahead of time, with respect of the regular termination of the
legislature, the clearer will be, even for the less sophisticated voters, that the termination of the
government was caused by the opportunistic intentions of an incumbent.
Since  the  constitution of  every  parliamentary  regime  establishes  the  length  of  each
legislature, from each election day it is possible to predict the day of the following election as the
constitution established. However, only in extremely rare cases the time between one election and
another will match the constitutionally mandated one. For this reason, I claim that the difference
between what is commonly known as an "early election" and a "regular election" is, in voters' eyes,
just a matter of degree. This leads to the formulation of a second hypothesis:
(H2.2) The popularity cost of opportunistic election timing is higher as the time period from
the constitutionally mandated election day increases.
These hypotheses will be subject of empirical testing.
Empirical Test
Every time a legislature  is  close  to  ending,  the  prime minister  or  a  government's  spokeperson
announces the date of the next election. Electors at that point observe the government's choice and
update their voting preferences, causing a variation in the valence capital of the incumbents. Testing
the  main  hypothesis  (H2.1)  thus  requires  a  measure  of  voting  intentions  before  a  government
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termination is called, to be compared with the actual electoral results. This measure is offered by
voting intention opinion polls, that are aimed at estimating the vote shares that each party would
receive in case the elections were held at the moment of the interview. If at least a segment of the
electorate changes voting preferences after a snap election is called, this change would be noted in
the  difference  between  the  shares  from  the  opinion  poll  forecasts  and  the  final  vote  shares.
Following this methodology, a dependent variable that captures the popularity shock an incumbent
party receives after calling an election was operationalized. This variable is meant to capture the
shift from the popularity levels of a governing party, signaled by an opinion poll before an election
day is announced, and its popularity levels in the aftermath of the election call.
I  first  collected opinion polls  from nine countries:  Australia,  Austria,  Canada,  Denmark,
Germany,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain and the United Kingdom, for  a  total  of fifty-nine governing
parties in fourty-five lections.  For each election in the dataset, I noted the day in which a new
election was announced to the general public, and collected the voting intention forecasts published
by the available polling institutes  up to a  wee up to  a week before that  day.  A mean of these
forecasts was then taken for each incument party, as an estimate of their popularity prior to the
election call; the difference between their shares and the actual vote shares each party got in the
following election was then measured. The variable popularity shock therefore represents, for each
governing party in each election of the dataset, a measurement of how voting intentions changed
around  the  time  of  an  election  call.  Dates  of  terminations  were  taken  from Parline,  the  Inter
Parliamentary  Union  database  on  national  parliaments,  and  the  ParlGov  database;  missing
information was added from news sources.13 Additionaly, I extended the main dataset available to
other incumbent-elections, collecting the last opinion polls available before an election call, up to a
month before that date. This allowed to add twelve other incumbent-election observations, tha I
employed for a second, separate analysis. The extended dataset includes the incument parties in
fifty-five elections in the same countries listed above, with the addition of the 2011 Finnish election.
13 Sources on general elections and voting intention opinion polls are available in Appendix C.
34
Following  this  central  hypothesis,  the  main  explanatory  variable  must  express  the  ideological
closeness of each party to its competitors. It is a variable used to capture the ideological proximity
of contiguous parties. With reference to an hypothetical three party legislature where a centrist party
(C) is located between a leftist (L) and a rightist (R) competitor (L < C < R), the proximity values
for the centrist party at the election j are:
PROXIMITYCj=
1
1+|R j−C j|
+ 1
1+|C j−L j|
The value that proximity takes, for each party in a given election, is the sum of the reciprocals of the
absolute distances between that party and its continguous competitor, increased by one. The unitary
increment in the denominator has been introduced in order to account for those rare cases in which
two or more parties have the same ideological position. Before computing the proximity values, all
those parties that received a vote share inferior to 2% were excluded. The natural logarithm of this
measure was taken, in order to normalize its distribution. In order to measure party positions, the
"rile" coefficients, from the Comparative Manifesto Project (MPD) dataset, were used to index a
party's ideological location on a general left-right axis. MPD scores allowed the gathering of the
largest dataset available, and to simultaneously include opinion polls published around the same
elections that Smith [2003, 2004] and Blais et al. [2004] covered in their empirical research. On the
basis of the predictions of the model specified above, a negative association between this variable
and popularity shock is expected: the more an incumbet is ideologically close to its competitors, the
more a manipulative action will be costly, in terms of support.
The  test  of  H2.2  requires  the  introduction  of  a  separate  explanatory  variable.  For  this
purpose, a continuous variable that measures how distant in time an election happened with respect
to the constitutionally mandated election day was used. Its values have been computed as follows:
first, the length of each legislature was standardized by finding the ratio between its actual duration
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and  its  ideal,  constitutionally  mandated  duration  (both  measured  in  days).  The  resulting ratio
coefficient takes the value of 1 when a legislature lasts the exact number of days as established by
the constitution of that country. This ratio doesn't range from 0 to 1, as might be expected, since in
few  cases  some  legislatures  lasted  slightly  longer  than  the  constitutionally  mandated  length.14
Second, the absolute difference between 1 and the actual normalized legislative length ratios was
taken.  This  variable,  labeled  time  distance,  measures  a  standardized  distance  between  the
constitutionally mandated duration of the legislature and the actual one, for each election in the
dataset. A negative association between this variable and popularity shock is expected, as the higher
the temporal distance between an election and its contitutionally mandated length, the more obvious
it will be to the electorate that the election was called for exceptional reasons, because of the will of
government leaders.
Another variable to be included in the test is the voter turnout level of each election. This
variable  is  of  crucial  importance,  since  several  electors  that  have  been  dissatisfied  by  the
government's  actions  might  choose  to  abstain  from  voting,  rather  than  opting  for  competing
candidates. This variable is calculated, for each country-election, as the ratio between the number of
valid  votes cast  and the number of citizens eligible to vote.15,  16 Data has been taken from the
14 In my dataset,  it  is  the case of 2007 Australian election, that lasted fourty-six days more than the three years
established by the Constitution of that country. Its corresponding length ratio is 1.042.
15 The choice of the number of valid votes is not random: in parliamentary systems several voters, once at
the polls, leave their ballor paper blank, as a form of protest towards the political system. Given that this
form of "protest vote" is extremely common, and that these voters don't have any real intention of casting
a vote for any political party,  voter turnout was calculated using the number of valid votes, instead of
their total number.
16 In some countries, such as Australia in the present dataset, voting is compulsory: every member of the
electorate that chooses to abstain from voting is punished with a small fee. This feature can explain the
comparatively high levels of voter turnout in Australia (in the dataset, never lower than 87.7%). I argue
that this peculiarity of Australian politics doesn't represent a problem for the empirical test, given that its
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ParlGov online database. Voter turnout is expected to be positively associated with the dependent
variable: some voters, being deluded by the government, might choose to abstain from voting rather
than opting for a rival candidate. In other words, lower voter turnouts should correspond to an
elevated cost for the governing party.
Using the same sources on election calls and dates outlined above, a variable measuring the
temporal length of the electoral campaign is included, counting the number of days between the
announcement of the election and the actual election day. If the government calls a snap election
and brings the country to the polls within a short time, it is likely that the popularity shock for the
incumbents will  be higher.  A longer  electoral  campaign might provide government parties with
enough time to organize an efficient electoral campaign and recover the support of some voters.
Given these assumptions, a positive correlation of campaign length with popularity shock is to be
expected.
I also included two different dummy variables in order to control for minority and oversized
governments. Since they are by nature unstable [see e.g. Strøm 1990], one can assume voters might
more  reasonably forgive  the  leaders  of  a  non-minimum winning  coalition  ending  ahead  of  its
mandate.
The statistical  model employed is  a linear  OLS regression with roubust standard errors.
Country-fixed  effects  are  included  in  the  models.17 The  results  are  shown in  Table  2.1,  where
Models 2.1 and 2.2 confirm the main hypotheses.
Proximity is negatively correlated with popularity shock; this supports the assumption that
ideological  closeness  makes  the  punishment  by  dissatisfied  voters  less  costly.  H2.1  is  thus
confirmed.
purpuse is not to investigate what factors affect voter turnout, but only its association with  popularity
shock.
17 The  Finland dummy variable in Model  2.2 is  not  included because of its  multicollinearity with the
oversized variable.
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Table 2.1. Determinants of popularity shock.
Model 2.1
(weekly means)
Model 2.2
(extended test)
Proximity –0.844 *
(0.446)
–0.783 **
(0.389)
Time distance –0.701 *
(0.394)
–0.836 **
(0.351)
Voter turnout 0.211
(0.164)
0.212
(0.133)
Campaign length 0.007
(0.113)
–0.032
(0.102)
Minority –0.814
(1.922)
–1.108
(1.736)
Oversized 1.234
(1.155)
Intercept –21.215
(14.152)
–20.418 *
(11.317)
Australia –1.808
(3.305)
–2.027
(2.713)
Austria 1.750
(6.230)
3.840
(5.478)
Canada 4.005
(3.193)
4.873
(3.037)
Denmark 1.120
(2.672)
1.138
(2.365)
Germany 5.582
(11.358)
9.259
(10.283)
Ireland 7.072 ***
(2.185)
5.802 ***
(1.995)
Portugal 3.376
(5.512)
7.287
(5.975)
Spain 1.514
(7.138)
2.975
(6.386)
N 59 71
R2 0.334 0.278
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The coefficient of time distance corroborates the hypothesis that when an election is widely
anticipated, even the most uninformed voters seem to understand that the election was caused by the
will of government leaders. This coefficient is perfectly in line with the predictions of the valence
theory exposed above, and represents also a partial confirmation of Smith's results, who concluded
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that voters tend to punish those prime ministers that call elections earlier than expected [2003:317].
Voter  turnout shows  the  expected  sign  in  both  cases,  but  didn't  reach  statistical  significance;
campaign length doesn't show a statistically significance impact as well.
In conclusion, Models 2.1 and 2.2 confirm the hypotheses formulated above, showing how
measures  of  ideological  proximity  successfully  explain  variations  in  the  popularity  shock  of
incumbent parties after their call for a snap election, and how the reaction of the electorate can be
captured by the temporal distance between each general election and its respective constitutionally
mandated election day.
What Happened in Canada?
As explained  in  the  literature  review,  Blais  et  al.  [2004]  didn't  find  evidence  of  a  significant
popularity cost of calling a snap election for the Canadian prime minister Chrètien for the early
election he called in 2000. This goes against the predictions of Smith [2003], who found that voters
in the United Kingdom tend to  punish those prime ministers  who call  an  election  earlier  than
expected [:412-417]. How to explain this discrepancy? The 2000 Canadian election deserves a more
thorough analysis.
The  formal  model  exposed  above  describes  how  the  cost  of  calling  a  snap  election,
expressed as a negative shock in the valence capital of an incumbent candidate, is not something
fixed and ever present, but variable in nature and subject to several determinants. On the basis of
the insights herein,  it  is  possible  to  solve an open dilemma that  characterized the literature on
election timing.
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The research by Blais et al. [2004] is impeccable, and the validity of their conclusions are
not in question, but the empirical findings noted here, forecasting the existence of a popularity cost
of  calling  a  snap  election  of  variable  magnitude,  only  seem  to  be  in  contradiction  with  the
conclusions they reached. Moreover, a model that is meant to explain variations in the magnitude of
this popularity cost must also be able to explain why in other cases this cost was minimal. The first
step is to observe the predictions of Model 2.1 and 2.2 with respect to the Canadian case study, and
to check if they correspond with the conclusions of Blais et al. [2004]. From its capacity to account
for  a  particular  case such as  the  2000 Canadian  early election,  it  will  be possible  to  judge its
heuristic validity. As it will be shown, the case of the 2000 Canadian election fits perfectly with the
empirical results reached here.
I started collecting the values of proximity and time distance on the twenty-three post war
Canadian elections (1945-2015).18 In particular, the time distance values have been calculated twice:
first,  treating  the  maximum length  of  Canadian  elections  as  of  five  years,  as  expressed  in  the
constitution; secondly, as Canadian legislatures had a maximum term of 4 years.19
The  Canadian  norm,  in  fact,  is  that  elections  take  place  every  four  years  [Blais  et  al.
2004:309]. Table 2.2 shows that in any case, the observation that corresponds to the 2000 Liberal
Party is in line with the predictions of my empirical test. Chrétien's party was at a comparatively
higher  ideological  distance  from  its  competitors,  and  at  a  temporal  distance  from  the
constitutionally mandated election day shorter than the country's average.
18 The methodology employed for the computation of the proximity values is the same as before: each party
with less than 2 percent of the votes has been excluded.
19 This  methodology must  exclude  elections  happened  after  the  2011  Elections  Act,  specifying  that  a
elections must  be held on the third Monday in the October of the fourth year after  the last  general
elections.
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Table 2.2. 2000 election standardized values.
Variable Z-scores
Proximity –0.1181
Time distance (five years) –0.1918
Time distance (four years) –0.6220
Although analyzing single variables can be helpful, the most obvious evaluation can be made by
looking at the predictions of the central empirical model. Figure 2.4 shows the density plots ot the
fitted values of Models 2.1 and 2.2, together with the values corresponding to the 2000 Canadian
election's forecasts of popularity shock.
Figure 2.4. Density plot of Models 2.1 and 2.2 fitted values
Note: Models' forecasts of popularity shock in parentheses.
It is visually clear how the empirical models proposed herein can predict the case of prime minister
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Chétien with surprising precision. Its fitted value approximates zero, meaning a complete lack of a
popularity cost for prime minister Chrétien. The popularity shock forecast for the Liberal party of
Canada in 2000 falls very close to the negligible popularity cost that was estimated by Blais et al.:
According to our estimates, 1 percent of the voters, and 2 percent of those who would have voted
Liberal in the absence of resentment, switched to another party because they disapproved of the
prime minister’s decision...
All in all, then, very few voters punished the prime minister for calling a snap election, and the
Liberals suffered a very small loss of one percentage point. Punishment there was, but the penalty
was quite small [2004:316].
As Blais et al. themselves found [2004], only a small fraction of informed voters understood that the
Canadian prime minister behaved opportunistically. As they stated:
The Canadian case indicates that some voters do react negatively when a prime minister calls an
election at an ‘inappropriate’ time, and that such resentment can move some voters to switch to the
opposition parties.  But  this  study also suggests that  the  electoral  cost  to  the  incumbent  party is
mitigated by the reality that many voters do not follow politics; they are likely to be unaware that the
election is early, and they are less likely to care [Blais et al. 2004 :317].
Their conclusion perfectly matches mine: it appears that the early termination, in that case, was so
close to the official termination of the legislature, that for most of the voters the snap election called
was indistinguishable from a regular one.
With the more general explanation provided, this paper showes why Smith [1996, 2003,
2004] and Blais et al. [2004] are both right in their different conclusions. Both the 2000 Canadian
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case study analyzed by the Blais et al., and the analyses provided by Smith on the opportunistic
timing of elections in United Kingdom represent particular cases of a more general phenomenon
that this valence theory is able to account for.
Conclusions
In parlamentary systems, government parties enjoy the power to either influence or determine the
timing of general elections. Calling a snap election is a choice that an incumbent takes in order to
take advantage of a peak in popularity, or in order to remedy for a loss of consensus, but the final
goal is always to maximize the chances of reelection. The choice of going to the polls ahead of time
is associated to a popularity cost, however and voters thend to negatively judge those government
leaders that behave in such an opportunistc way. A prime minister that calls an election earlier than
expected may be accused of putting to personal interests before the needs of the nation that he or
she represents.
The  present  chapter  examined  the  magnitude  of  this  popularity  cost.  This  topic  is
surprisingly unresearched, and no comparative research had ever been conducted before. Moreover,
the few previous works published collected very scarce evidence and reached contradictory results
[Smith 1996, 2003, 2004; Blais et al. 2004]. This chapter develops a novel theory that can explain
variations of its  magnitude.  The formal model presented above linked, for the first  time in the
literature, the problem of opportunistic election timing with valence theories of spatial competition.
It was shown how the popularity loss that follows the call of an early election can be described as a
negative shock in the valence capital of the incumbent, and that the magnitude of this cost can be
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effectively expressed as a variation in the size of the Stokes region, i.e.:  that set of voters that
choose  not  to  vote  for  the  ideologically  closer  candidate  because  of  a  valence  differential
[Groseclose 2001]. This model allowed the formulation of a fundamental prediction: "the popularity
cost of opportunistic election timing is higher as the ideological distance between parties shrinks",
together with  a series of corollary hypotheses.  All of my predictions have been confirmed by the
first comparative test run on this topic.
The analysis covered a total of fifty-five parliamentary election from ten countries, United
Kingdom and Canada included.  Government parties are found to suffer greater popularity losses
when ideologically closer to other competitors, and when the election called is more distant in time
from the constittionally mandated election day.
Once the predictions of this model have been successfully tested, it was possibile to solve an
unanswered problem in the literature. My valence theory, together with the insights provided by the
main empirical test, help explain why in the 2000 Canadian election the popularity shock for prime
minister  Chrétien was negligible,  and to  reconcile  the empirical  results  found by Smith [2003,
2004], and the ones from Blais et al.  [2004]. The raw predictions of this main empirical model
describe  the  Chrétien's  case  with  great  precision.  With  respect  to  the  subgroup  of  Canadian
observation from my main dataset, the 2000 election represents a special case: its proximity values
are among the lowest, meaning that for unhappy supporters of the Liberal party, switching from
Chrétien to another candidate was comparatively more costly; and the distance between the snap
election day and the respective constitutionally mandated election day was lower than in  other
cases, making it harder for uninformed voters to distinguish that election from a regular one.
All the evidence gathered suggests that in 2000, prime minister Chrétien was in a situation
that  was singularly favourable for  the call  of a  snap election.  The empirical  findings  from the
different works of Smith [2003, 2004] and Blais et al. [2004], thus, do not contradict each other, but
represent  specific  cases  of  a  more  general  phenomenon  that  this  valence  theory  was  able  to
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describe. This might finally put an end to the debate over the existence and the magnitude of the
popularity cost of calling a snap election, a question that has been asked since 2004 at least.
The arguments stated here about the role that valence issues play on the likelihood of a
cabinet termination, if generalized, can produce interesting insights on coalition theory and cabinet
stability. Why ideologically compact calitions of competitive parties stand longer than others? From
the traditional works of voting models [Black 1958, Arrow 1951; McKelvey 1976] it can be inferred
that  members  of  a  relatively  cohesive  group  of  parties  competing  on  one,  or  more  than  one
continuous ideological dimensions are by no means less litigious and combative than members of a
more  heterogeneous  group.  From  the  simple  valence  model  herein  it  can  be  inferred  that
ideologically  compact  coalitions  last  longer  not  just  because  they  tend  to  produce  less  costly
agreements for the parties involved, but also because the valence shock that would be paid in case
of their opportunistic termination could make it too costly to opt out. Moreover, this model allows
for a new explanation of why minority governments are comparatively more unstable than minimal
winning coalitions: a non-governing party providing external support to a cabinet could cause the
end of the cabinet without paying a valence cost. All these insights should become the object of
future research.
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Chapter 3
A Formal Model of Cabinet Termination in Consensual
Parliamentary Systems
In Chapter 2 it was showed how valence issues can be incorporated in a formal theory of election
timing  in  parliamentary  systems,  and  how  this  allowed  for  both  theoretical  and  empirical
improvements. This chapter is meant to generalize the theoretical insights of the previous, in order
to achieve a general theory of election timing in complex parliamentary systems.
Consensual democracies are often charachterized by more than one party at the government.
The formation of coalitions is due to the strongly proportional nature of those electoral systems,
often leading to situations in which no party represented in the parliament controls the absolute
majority  of  the  seats.  Once  the  cabinet  has  been  formed  and  portoflios  have  been  allocated,
coalition partners negotiate over a policy agreement. During the legislature though, this agreement
can  be  changed  by the  parties;  nothing  stops  a  member  of  the  coalition  the  reject  the  initial
agreement but her self-interested compliance. In fact, once a new cabinet is established and the
initial agreement is found, government parties find themselves in a continuous bargain over public
policies. The outcome of this negotiation depends also on another option that is available for each
government party: a coalition member can choose, in any moment of the legislature, to withdraw
from the government coalition and open a government crisis. In some cases, a government crisis
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can lead to the establishment of a new cabinet, supported by a different government coalition, while
in other cases it can determine a premature termination of the legislature, forcing voters to go to the
polls ahead of time.
A cabinet termination might not have the same value for each member of the coalition. If
opinion polls forecasts tell to government leaders that one of the incumbent parties enjoys a strong
advantage  with  respect  to  other  coalition  partners,  this  will  provide  that  party  with  a  strong
bargaining weight that can be exploited in order to obtain more favourable agreements. A party that
is  advantaged  by  the  termination  of  the  coalition  can  extort  policy  concessions  from  the
disadvantaged partners, in exchange of government stability.  These observations are perfectly in
line with the theoretical insights provided Lupia and Strom [1995] and Diermeier and Stevenson
[2000], according to which  the threat of a snap election can be exploited by incumbents in order to
extract policy benefits form electorally disadvantages parties.
These dynamics of parliamentary politics can be intuitively represented as a non-cooperative
bargaining game. Incumbent members of the cabinet can be seen as a set of self-interested players,
bargaining  over  a  policy surplus,  or  the  set  of  potential  public  policies  that  players  find  more
convenient of the status quo; provided the existence of an exit option, or disagreement point, i.e.:
the utility that each player realized in case the negotiation fails. Such a game is based on a constant
blackmailing relationship among coalition partners, in which who can credibly threaten to terminate
the government ahead of time can exploit her electoral advantage in order to obtain more favourable
policies.  In  each  moment  of  the  legislature,  government  party  leaders  can  choose  between
withdrawing from the coalition and open a government crisis,  or keeping the cabinet alive and
negotiate over public policies.
There are several ways that can lead an incumbent to cause a negotiation failure: first, a
party can choose to terminate the cabinet and bring the country to the polls in order to not loose too
many votes; second, a popular party might choose to step out of the cabinet in order to maximize
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her electoral gains before it is too late [Smith 2004]. In any of these cases, electoral expectations
appear to be the main determinant of opportunistic election timing. This leads to the conclusion that
it must be possible to explain the likelihood of cabinet termination by looking at the variation in
parties' electoral expectations.
After having provided a general description of the theoretical problem that I am going to
investigate, the chapter continues as follows: first, I will expose the bargaining game that constitutes
the pillar of my valence theory of election timing; second, I will deduce some prediction that will be
tested empirically on a comparative dataset. A commentary will conclude.
Structure of the Game
The structure of the game that I am going to outline takes, as a starting point, the valence model
explained in Chapter 2. More specifically, it is the case of a multiparty legislature, as represented in
Figure 2.2. A unidimensional model of this kind allows to represent, at the same time, the utility
functions  of a  set  of candidates competing on a general  ideological  space,  and the utility of a
continuous set of voters that are uniformly distributed over the ideological axis. Each voter's utility
functions corresponds to equation (2.1).
The game is composed of three players: A is the prime minister's party, leading the coalition;
B is the coalition partner; C is the opposition party. The game starts after the newly formed cabinet
is established, and the allocation of portfolios and the coalition agreement over public policies are
approved.
In every moment of the legislature, any party P's instantaneous utility is:
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uP
t =GλP−(P−x )
2+νP , (3.1)
where:
P represents the party's ideal point.
x  is  the  public  policy  agreement,  found  on  a  single-dimensional  ideological  space;  its
quadratic distance from P's ideal point represents her policy-seeking utility.
G is the total office utility available from governing, while λP is the office-seeking share of
party P, taken from the vector of office shares Λ = (λA, λB, λC). In this specific game: λC=0, and
λA+λB=1; the two elements combined represent the office utility of party P.
νP represents  the  valence  capital  of  the  party.  Without  lack  of  generality  and  for
mathematical convenience, I state any νP is high enough to have always positive values for the
players' utility functions throughout the game20,21.
The actors play in time, which is represented by a variable t = 1, ... ,T; where T represents
the maximum length of the legislature.
The structure of a first game is depicted in Figure 3.1. The sequence of moves is, for each
round t, as follows:
20 For negative values the discount factors in the game will  increase, rather than decrease, the players'
utilities in time, leading to absurd results.
21 It might be objected that the valence capital of a party should enter the utility functions of the voters
alone, not to one of candidates; the valence capital is one of those elements that a voter weights in
choosing a candidate at the polls. A high valence capital is thus useful for the candidate, but only as a
function of her future office and policy utilities, not per se. Even though these are reasonable arguments,
I  consider that  including the valence capital  in  the partie's  utiliy functions  is  not  an error:  it  is  not
counterintuitive to assume parties and candidates to enjoy high reputation. For most politicians, and for
prime ministers in particular, going down in history as a very honest and competent politician, rather than
a "rascal", is of fundamental importance. For this reason, valence capital enters additively in the utility
function of parties and candidates.
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(i) First, Nature reveals parties' popularity, i.e.: generates the values of the exit option.
(ii) Second, the prime minister's party makes a move, choosing between bargaining over
policies with her coalition partner B; substituting the existing coalition and forming a new cabinet
with C; or calling a snap election.
(iii)  Third,  in  case  the  prime  minister  didn't  call  a  snap  election,  B  and  C  play  their
respective bargaining games with A, leading to outcomes they can accept or refuse.
Figure 3.1. Game Tree 1.
It must be noted that in this game the prime minister party is in a centrist position. Being the pivotal
party the process of coalition formation, i.e.: when no possible coalition can exclude A, the prime
minister is in a significant bargaining advantage.
But this game doesn't exhaust all the possible situations that can be analyze by my theory. If
the prime minister's party is instead located in a non pivotal position, as in Games 2 and 3, the rules
of the game change. What makes the difference here are the prime minister prerogatives of directly
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calling a early election.
Figure 3.2. Game Tree 2.
Figure 3.3. Game Tree 3.
The difference between Game 2 and Game 3 deserves  a  further  explanation.  In  some political
systems the Head of the state is a non-partisan political actor. It is the case of monarchs, such as in
Denmark  or  the  Netherlands,  where  real  election  timing  powers  are  in  the  hands  of  the
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government's elected officials, or the prime minister alone. This is due to the fact that in modern
constitutional monarchies the role of kings and queens is purely representative one; as a matter of
fact, they limit themselves to execute the will of the prime minister or the cabinet.
In case of those polities charachterized by a partisan Head of the State instead, such as
Austria and Italy, the political game is more complex: the Head of the State has a real dissolution
powers, that can be used in order to oppose the will of the prime minister, restraining the call of a
snap election. A legislature cannot be dissolved without his approval. In those countries in which
the Head of the State is non partisan, thus, prime ministers, and incumbents in general, don't have
the same freedom in timing general elections. It is thus necessary to distinguish between polities in
which the prime minister has the power to unilaterally terminate the cabinet (Game 2), and those in
which the dissolution powers are in the hands of the Head of the State (Game 3).
In the next section I will  expound the foundations of a simple bargaining subgame that
constitutes the theoretical core of the present model. In fact, all the three games are charachterized
by one or more bargaining interaction among players, each following the same pattern.
Bargaining over Policies
As it was outlined in the introduction, government parties are involved in a continuous bargaining
on public policies. The set of all possible outcomes can be represented on a cartesian plane as a
utility  curve,  which  represents  the  competitive,  non-cooperative  nature  of  the  game.  The  axes
represent the utility of each player. On the same plane, it is possible, for both the players in the
negotiation, to locate an exit option ΘLR
t that represents parties' exit values. The position of the
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exit option on the bargaining space allows us to individuate a surplus set S, i.e. a set of Pareto-
optimal potential public policies on which the governing parties start a negotiation.
Mathematically speaking, when ΘLR
t is below the parties'  utility curve,  it  can be statet
that: S={ x  [x∈ L, xR] }, where xL and xR are the boundaries of S, as depicted in Figure 3.4. When
the exit option is above the utility curve instead, no public policy available is Pareto-optimal for the
players, i.e. no point on the utility curve satisfies both the parties involved; therefore, S = { }.∅
Figure 3.4. Bargaining surplus on the parties' utility curves.
This bargaining subgame is thus played not on the whole utility curve, by only on the non-empty
surplus projected by the exit option in the bargaining space. The remaining policies on the utility
curve do not represent credible alternatives for the parties involved. As it will be shown below, this
subgame can lead to three alternative outcomes: a conservation of the status quo policy; a new
policy agreement, different from the previous one; or a failure of the negotiation, in case no policy
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agreement can be found.
In order to keep the model simple, I assume coalition parties with equal bargaining weights
to find the middle point among the surplus set S. For a more mathematically refined model, I could
have specified a series of different bargaining weights, justified, for example, on the basis of an
unequal distribution of office benefits or values for the exit option. Otherwise, I could have used the
Rubinstein  solution  [1982],  which  is  especially  appropriate  for  the  class  of  non-cooperative
bargaining games. However, even adding these refinements, the model would have reached exactly
the same conclusions. For this reason, I will keep that the outcome of a bargaining interaction from
a non-empty set S, corresponds to xm=(xR−xL)
1
2
.
From this framework, in each step of the game t,  a coalition party's  choice to keep the
cabinet alive and to continue the negotiation on public policies is represented by a continuation
value that includes the instantaneous utility given by the bargaining, and the uncertainty regarding
future outcome of the negotiation in the following period t+1. The structure of this continuation
value, inspired by Kayser [2005], is a quasi-recursive equation, based on the Bellman principle of
optimality:
VP
t (bargain )=[GλP−(P−xm )2+νP](T−t) +ρE [u Pt+1](T−t−1) (3.2)
The first part of the equation represents the utility of governing at time t, and it is nothing but the
instantaneous utility given the current office share and policy, weighted by the amount of time left
before the end of the legislature. The second part of the equation is represented by the (discounted)
expected utility of playing in the following period t+1.
Because actors don't know the future positions of the exit option, the policy agreement at
t+1 is unknown too. For this reason, the expected utility of governing in the following step is:
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uP
t+1=GλP−(P−β)
2+νP , (3.3)
given:
β∼Uniform [L , R ]
The policy outcome β of the future bargaining interaction is not known in advance, assuming the
players' ignorance about the location of the exit option in the following periods.
The outcome of the bargaining subgame depends from the position of the exit option, which
deserves a deeper analysis. In order to be represented on the bargaining space, the exit option of a
bargaining  game  must  be  defined  as  a  vector  of  continuation  values,  one  for  each  players,
representing what value each player would get from a negotiation failure.  This value, for each
player,  can  correspond  to  a  substitution  of  the  current  cabinet  or  to  an  anticipated  election,
depending on the type of game and on the parties' electoral expectations. In the next paragraphs I
will examine the other moves available for the players.
Substitution of the Governing Coalition
The structure of the utility of a party who chooses to substitute the current governing coalition with
a new one is similar, but not identical to the previous bargaining interaction. Once the substitution is
done, given that the preferences of the new incumbents have changed, a new policy agreement is to
be found through the same bargaining game exposed above. However, forming a new governing
coalition  also means a  reshuffle  of  the  previous  cabinet,  with a  allocation of  portfolios  that  is
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associated with a redistribution of office benefits. How this reallocation happens is based on the
intuitive assumption that office benefits are distributed among coalition partners on the basis of
their bargainig weights at the moment of cabinet formation. In other words, once a governing party
chooses to end the current coalition and forms a new cabinet with an opposition party, the new
office shares distribution will depend from the electoral advantage of one party over the other.
Let us take the example of the three-party legislature depicted in Figure 2.2 (L<P<R), and
assume that party P is governing in a coalition with L. The status quo distribution of office shares is
described as Λ = (λL, λP, 0). If P chooses to exit the coalition and form a new cabinet with R, the
new office shares will be distributed on the basis of the value each party gets by opting out of the
negotiation. In other words, the new office shares would be:
λPo= VPt (exit)VPt (exit)+VRt (exit ) , λRo= VRt (exit )VPt (exit )+VRt (exit ) (3.4a), (3.4b)
These formulas are motivated in the following way: the party that sees anticipated elections as an
advantageous option is in a stronger position than a party that would likely suffer a loss from it. The
shares vector Λ will thus be substituted by a new Λ°=(0, λ°P, λ°R).22 The substitution of the old
cabinet with a new one, together with a new policy agreement, will thus generate the following
utility for each party P:
22 The new vector of office shares, as described by equations (3.4) seems to be in contrast witht Gamson
law, that predicts a distribution of office benefits, among coalition parties,  that is proportional to the
number of parliamentary seats each party controls.  I  claim this feature of the present  model  doesn't
contitute a problem, for at least two reasons. First, a greater parliamentary size for a party entails, all
things equal, stronger bargaining powers (as predicted by the model) and a larger share of office benefits
(as  predicted  by  Gamson  law).  Second,  it  represents  an  affordable  simplification  of  reality:  the
differences from what predicted by Gamson law do not alter the conclusions of the model, that will be
presented below. For these reasons, I assume there is not reason to further complicate it.
56
VP
t (substitute )=[GλPo−(P−xmo )2+νP](T−t) +ρE [u Pt+1](T−t−1) (3.5)
Equation (3.5) is similar to equation (3.2), but it comprehends new office shares vector Λ° and a
new policy agreement xm
o is found between the new parties involved.
Calling a Snap Election
This part of the model is broadly based on the insights of the valence theory reported in chapter 2.
When  party  P chooses  to  withdraw  from  the  governing  coalition,  causing  the  occurrence  of
anticipated elections, its utility is represented by a value that is a function of the exit value of the
current  moment,  minus the stochastic  valence cost  caused by the opportunistic  behavior  of the
party:
VPt (exit)={ωPt +1−(T−tT )E [ΔP ]}T (3.6)
This value is composed of three elements. First, the exit value of the bargaining game of the current
round ωP
t which is, theoretically speaking, a combination of expected office and policy utilities.
To keep the model simple,  I will define the whole vector of exit  values Ωt={ωA
t ,ωB
t ,ωC
t } as
known by the players. Second, following the nomenclature of chapter 2, the term ΔP represents the
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variation  in  the  size  of  the  Stokes  region  due  to  the  valence  loss  of  the  party  that  causes  a
government termination. The value of ΔP was proven to change as the ideological distance between
a party and its adjacent competitors changes.
In case the party P is at the extreme of the ideological axis, the cost of an ε valence shock is
calculated as:
ΔP= ϵP2(R−P) (3.7)
Where R is a generic party located at its right. In case P is in a non-extremist position, but is located
instead between a more lefist party L and a more rightist party R, then the variation in the size of the
Stokes regions (to the left and to the right) is computed as:
ΔP= ϵP2(P−L)+ ϵP2(R−P)= ϵP(R−L)2(P−L)(R−P) (3.8)
In my model,  the party causing cabinet termination pays  a cost that depends from a stochastic
valence shock represented by ε:
ϵ∼Uniform[0,~ϵ ]
Where ε represents the degree of volatility of the party system, or how uncertain voters are. Given
equation 2.2, it follows that:
ΔP=
ϵP
2(R−P) (3.9a)
in case P is an extreme party, and;
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ΔP= ϵP(R−L)2(P−L)(R−P) (3.9b)
in  case  P is  located  in  a  non-extreme  position.  The  third  element  of  a  party's  exit  value  is
represented by a discount factor that reduces the valence cost of calling a snap election the more ot
is called close to its respective constitutionally mandated termination. The term [(T-t)/T] shrinks the
value of ΔP to zero as t approaches T. The reason of this discount is based on the empirical findings
of the previous chapter, where it was shown that highly anticipated elections tend to be punished
more severly than the ones that have been called closer to the constitutionally mandated election
day.  This is also in line with the findings of Smith [2003, 2004], who showed that the more an
election is called ahead of time, the more clear it will be for voters that the incumbent behaved
opportunistically.
The popularity cost  of  calling a  snap election,  appropriately time-discounted,  enters  the
player's  utility  function  additively  for  two  reasons:  first,  it  allows  to  avoid  unnecessary
complications of my model;  second,  it  saves me from making unnecessary assumptions on the
ideological distribution of the electorate.
Once a party looses votes by causing an early election opportunistically, some part of the
electorate will opt for other candidates, to the advantage of adjacent parties. When party P suffers
from the valence shock, the parties on the left and on the right get a proportionate share of utility,
weighted for an α share, capturing abstentionism:
VLt (exit )={ωLt+1+α(T−tT )E[ΔP ]} (3.10a)
VRt (exit )={ωRt+1+α(T−tT )E[ΔP]} (3.10b)
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The importance of a decreasing cost of calling a snap election can be observed graphically. Figure
3.5 represents how two utilities (of keeping a policy throughout the game and of calling a snap
election) change as time passes. The instantaneous utilities of the policy agreement and the exit
value are the same; this simulation just depicts the effects of time on the model. 
For  each  player,  the  value  of  causing  a  snap  election  and  and  the  value  of  a  cabinet
substitution can constitute the exit option of a bargaining subgame. The pair of exit values that
constitute  the  exit  option ΘLR
t of  a  bargaining  subgame  among  two  generic  L and  R  parties,
changes depending on the players electoral expectations and the rules of the game.
Figure 3.5. Cost-benefit analysis of election calling over time.
Note: Parameter values are the same used for Figure 2.2.
For example, in Game 1, player A will choose an optimal strategy a* among the three strategies
available by solving:
maxuA {bargain ,substitute ,exit }
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while for players B and C, whose only options are accepting or rejecting the outcome of their
respective bargaining subgames, the exit option of is always represented by their respective exit
values.
Once  the  players'  continuation  values  and  the  nature  of  the  exit  option  in  bargaining
subgames have been explored, it is possible to expose a solution of the bargaining game.
Figure 3.5. Bargaining subgame.
Solution of the Bargaining Subgame
Every bargaining interaction among two players follows the same pattern, depicted in the figure
below, in which a coalition is formed between a generic leftist party L (the first proposer) and a
rightist party R. The proposer party can choose to terminate the coalition or to gatekeep the status
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quo policy.
In order to understand how the outcome each negotiation changes we must look at the value
represented by the exit option. On the basis of the location of the status quo policy, the bargaining
space can be divided in six sectors. These sectors are associated with different outcomes of the
game.
Sector I. Both L and R suffer from calling an early election. In this case, the likelihood of
government termination is the lowest possible. Only an exogenous shock, such as a scandal or an
international crisis, can tear down the cabinet. In this sector, no party can use the exit option as a
credible threat. The status quo wins against any other proposal.
Figure 3.6. Sectors of the bargaining space.
Sector II. In this case, one of the two players gains by withdrawing from the negotiation,
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while the other suffers a utility loss, but there is room for a new bargaining on public policies.
Player R can exploit her advantage and blackmail L, claiming more favourable policies in exchange
of not terminating the cabient.
Sector III. As in the previous case, one party gains while the other suffers from exiting the
coalition.  The only difference is  that  in  this  case there is  no room for renegotiating the policy
agreement: no point in the [xL, xR] interval Pareto-dominates the exit option.
Sector IV. Both players gain by terminating the cabinet; this situation corresponds to the
highest probability of cabinet termination.
Figure 3.7. Solution and failure of a bargaining subgame (sectors III
and VI).
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Sector V. This sector is analogous to Sector III. It represents a case in which parties cannot
reach any new policy agreement.
Sector VI. This case is the mirror image of Sector II, with L advantaged over R instead. The
outcome is a renegotiation on the government's public policies.
Thanks to the insights just provided, my model is able to explain why the same policy agreement, or
the same location of the exit option, can lead to different outcomes of the game, if taken in different
moments of the game. This can be noted graphically, with reference to Figure 3.8. Certain electoral
expectations can lead to a second negotiation on public policies in an early time of the legislature,
and to a bargaining failure in later times. This provides a efficacious game-theoretic description of
the effects of time on the incumbent parties' negotiation on public policies.
Figure 3.8. Effect of time on players' choices.
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Every bargaining subgame represents a continuation value for each player that can be described by
a mapping VL
t =ΓL((L,R ),Λ , xSQ ,Θt) which is a function the players involved, the distribution
of office shares (that can be changed by a cabinet substitution), the value of their exit option, the
status quo policy. Its values are reported in Table 3.1.
At this point, each of the three Games can be solved by backward induction.
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Game 1
Table 3.2. Equilibrium payoffs for Game 1. 
Sector (A, C) negotiation
I
VA
t (bargain)=[G λAo −(A−xSQ)2+νA ](T−t)+ρE[uAt+1](T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[−(B−xSQ)2+νB](T−t )+ρE[ uBt+1](T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[GλCo −(C−xSQ)2+νC](T−t)+ρE[ uCt+1](T−t−1)
II, VI
VA
t (bargain)=[G λAo −(A−xm)2+νA](T−t)+ρE [uAt+1 ](T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[−(B−xm )2+νB](T−t)+ρE [uBt+1](T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[GλCo −(C−xm )2+νC](T−t )+ρE [uCt+1](T−t−1)
III-V
VAt (exit )={ωAt+1−(T−tT )E [ΔA ]}T
VBt (exit)={ωBt+1+α(T−tT )E [ΔA ]}T
VCt (exit )={ωCt+1+α(T−tT )E [ΔA ]}T
(continues)
In this game describes a situation in which A is the pivotal party. In this case A can unilaterally
choose to either keeping the existing coalition alive, substituting it with a new cabinet, or calling a
snap election. Her two possible interactions with B and C correspond to the bargaining subgame
that I have solved above. Even though the two possible negotiations follow the same pattern, they
generate  different  payoffs  for  the  players:  (A,  B)  bargaining  follows  the  standars  bargaining
subgame; the (A, C) bargaining instead brings with it a new coalition and a redistribution of the
office shares (in case a snap election is not called).
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(continued)
Sector (A, B) negotiation
I
VA
t (bargain)=[GλA−(A−xSQ )2+νA ](T−t)+ρE[uAt+1](T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[GλB−(B−xSQ)2+νB](T−t)+ρE[ uBt+1](T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[−(C−xSQ)2+νC](T−t )+ρE[ uCt+1](T−t−1)
II, VI
VA
t (bargain)=[GλA−(A−xSQ )2+νA ](T−t)+ρE[uAt+1](T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[GλB−(B−xm )2+νB](T−t )+ρE [uBt+1](T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[−(C−xm )2+νC](T−t)+ρE [uCt+1](T−t−1)
III-V
If a* = exit
VAt (exit )={ωAt+1−α(T−tT )E [ΔA ]}
VBt (exit)={ωBt+1+α(T−tT )E [ΔB]}T
Vct (exit)={ωct+1+α(T−tT )E [Δc ]}T
If a* = substitute
VA
t =ΓA((A ,C),Λ
o , xSQ ,Θ
t)
VB
t =ΓB((A,C),Λ
o , xSQ ,Θ
t)
VC
t =ΓC((A,C),Λ
o , xSQ ,Θ
t)
Since the game requires a backward induction solution, the payoffs of the (A, C) bargaining are first
exposed in Table 3.2. In this particulare case, players A and B negotiate on a substitute cabinet,
implying not just a new policy agreement, but also a modification of the offices shares vector. The
(A, B) bargaining instead happens on the basis of the outcome of the (A, C) subgame. Player B
chooses whether accepting the outcome of the negotiation with A, knowing that a refusal will put A
in the condition to choose an optimal move a* by solving:
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maxVA {exit ,substitute},
that  is,  choosing between calling  a  snap election  and starting  a  new subgame with  C,  for  the
substitution  of  the  cabinet.  A's  choice  influences  the  value  of  the  exit  option  of  the  (A,  B)
bargaining.
A's first choice is then found by solving:
maxVA {bargain , substitute , exit ,}.
Game 2
In this case, the (B, C) bargaining follows exactly the same pattern as the (A, C) bargaining in
Game 1; for this reason, the (B, C) payoffs don't need to be reported.
This  game presents  a  peculiarity:  the  (A,  B)  subgame in  this  case  differs  from normal
negotiations. Its exit option depends from what B will choose in the following nodes. B has two
ways of refusing to make the bargaining fail: causing anticipated elections, or attempting to form a
new cabinet with C. In case of a negotiation failure, B would choose an optimal move b* in the
following way:
maxVB {reject ,substitute}.
69
In an analogous way, A can choose whether calling a snap election or continuing her negotiation
over public policies with B. Finding a* will solve:
maxVA {bargain ,exit }.
Table 3.3. Equilibrium payoffs for Game 2.
(A, B) negotiation
I
VA
t (bargain )=[G λA−(A−xSQ)2+νA](T−t)+ρE [uAt+1 ](T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[GλB−(B−xSQ)2+νB](T−t)+ρE[ uBt+1](T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[−(C−xSQ)2+νC](T−t)+ρE[ uCt+1](T−t−1)
II, VI
VA
t (bargain)=[GλA−(A−xSQ )2+νA ](T−t)+ρE[uAt+1](T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[GλB−(B−xm )2+νB](T−t )+ρE [uBt+1](T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[−(C−xm )2+νC](T−t)+ρE [uCt+1](T−t−1)
III-V
If b* = reject
VAt (exit )={ωAt+1+α(T−tT )E [ΔB ]}T
VBt (exit)={ωBt+1−(T−tT )E [ΔB ]}T
VCt (exit )={ωCt+1+α(T−tT )E [ΔB ]}T
If b* = substitute
VA
t =ΓA ((B,C),Λ
o , xSQ ,Θ
t)
VB
t =ΓB((B,C) ,Λ
o, xSQ ,Θ
t)
VC
t =ΓC((B,C) ,Λ
o, xSQ ,Θ
t)
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Game 3
Table 3.4. Equilibrium payoffs for Game 3.
(B, C) negotiation
I
VA
t (bargain)=[−(A−xSQ )2+νA ](T−t)+ρE [uAt+1](T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[GλBo −(B−xSQ)2+νB](T−t )+ρE[ uBt+1] (T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[GλCo −(C−xSQ)2+νC](T−t)+ρE[ uCt+1](T−t−1)
II, VI
VA
t (bargain)=[−(A−xm)2+νA ](T−t )+ρE[ uAt +1] (T−t−1)
VB
t (bargain )=[GλBo −(B−xm )2+νB](T−t)+ρE [uBt+1](T−t−1)
VC
t (bargain )=[GλCo −(C−xm )2+νC](T−t )+ρE [uCt+1](T−t−1)
III-V
VAt (exit )={ωAt+1+α(T−tT )E[ ϵB2(B−A) ]}VBt (exit )={ωBt+1−(T−tT )E [ΔB ]}T
VAt (exit )={ωAt+1+α(T−tT )E[ ϵB2(A−B) ]}
This game is very similar to Game 2; the payoffs produced by the (A, B) and (B, C) bargaining
subgames are identical and will not be repeated.
The difference is an additional, lower branch that is not present in Game 2. It represents A's option
of opening a government crisis; B can choose between causing a snap election, and thus paying the
valence cost for the opportunistic action, and attempting to form a new cabinet with C. In this last
case the valence cost will be payed by A, who caused the cabinet crisis in first place.
The lower subgame can thus be solved backwardly:
maxVB {substitute ,exit }
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and
maxVA {bargain ,exit }
In the next section, I will subject the fundamental predictions of the present theoretical model to
empirical testing.
Empirical Test
At the beginning of the legislature, a policy agreement is found among coalition parties, which can
be  assumed  to  be  stable  for  at  least  two  reasons.  First,  the  post-electoral  negotiations  on  the
formation of the cabinet and its policy agreement are based on the bargaining weights of each of the
parties involved, that depend from the distribution of electoral support for the parties; it is a long
and complex bargaining game, and parties would unlikely want to break an agreement they just
approved. Second, as the evidence provided in the previous chapter suggests, breaking a cabinet in
the early stages of the legislature might represent a significant popularity cost for the incumbent that
is responsible of the termination. What are the conditions that, at some point during the legislature,
make a cabinet termination more likely?  The answer can be found by looking at the incumbent
parties' exit option, i.e.: their distribution of electoral advantages and disadvantages.
The bargaining subgame that was solved in Table 3.1 is based on a fundamental assumption:
the outcome in a bargaining game on public policies among government parties depends from their
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electoral expectations. It seems thus possible to describe the probability of a cabinet termination by
looking at voting forecasts provided by voting intention opinion polls.  In the formal terms of the
model exposed herein: the more an exit  option moves from the conditions that made a cabinet
possible  (Sector  I),  and as  more  time  passes,  the  more  likely will  be  that  at  least  one  of  the
incumbent parties will find a cabinet termination advantageous, or that the bargaining game will fail
(Sectors III-V). It seem then reasonable to assume that turbulence in government parties' popularity
is a proxy for the conditions that are more likely to lead to an anticipated cabinet termination. In
other words, the stronger turbulence in governing parties' popularity is, the more it is likely that
some incumbent will be interested in calling a snap election, and the more costly will be to find an
alternative policy compromise that is acceptable for all. Recalling the insights form the introduction
of this chapter, a party might want to terminate a cabinet for a number of reasons, such as forecasts
of bad future performances, that might lead an incumbent to terminate the cabinet in order to "not
loose too much", or peaks of popularity, that bring a party to choose to take electoral gains from an
advantageous temporary situation before it's too late [Smith 2004].  In all of these cases, it can be
legitimately assumed that a significant shift of the exit option form the initial conditions of the
legislature can alter the players' preferences on the survival of the government.
The first, main prediction that can be tested in order to control the validity of my model is
the following:
(H3.1) A higher turbulence in the distribution of electoral advantages and/or disadvantages
among  the  members  of  a  governing  coalition  is  associated  with  a  higher  likelihood  of
cabinet termination.
A second hypothesis is meant to establish a connection with the empirical findings of the previous
chapter. As it was shown, an incumbent party will be more likely to call an early election the more
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her competing candidates are ideologically distant. In other words, when there are no candidates
that  are  ideologically  similar  to  any  incumbent,  then  the  majority  of  voters  that  have  been
disappointed by the opportunistic cabinet termination will not be able to punish them with their
vote. In this case, the hypothesis can be stated as:
(H3.2) A higher ideological dispersion of the legislature will be associated with a higher
probability of cabinet termination.
On the basis of the empirical findings of Chapter 2, a legislature that is ideologically more dispersed
will produce, on average, cabinets that are less costly (in terms of popularity) to tear down.
A third  hypothesis  can  be  deduced  from my  model  by  recalling  the  difference  in  the
structure of the three games above. If a Head of the State has strong dissolution powers, that by
definition are subtracted to the prime minister or the cabinet, then it will be harder, for opportunistic
incumbents, to time general elections whenever they want. In more formal terms:
(H3.3)  The  presence  of  a  partisan  Head  of  the  State,  provided  with  strong  dissolution
powers, will lower the likelihood of cabinet termination.
When prime ministers, or government parties more generally, are not completely free in timing
general elections, they would anticipate the stabilizing role of the Head of the State, whose purpose
is to guarantee political stability and to concede an early election only when inevitable.
The test of H3.1 requires a measure of the turbulence in government parties' popularity, i.e.:
a measure of the variation in the distribution of advantages and disadvantages changes with respect
to the conditions that brought the cabinet into existence. In order to do this, I needed a measure
based on series of voting intention polls, showing how parties' popularity changes through time. The
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value of a measure based opinion polls is especially intuitive given that they probably represent the
same tool that actual government leaders use on a daily basis in order to check their popularity
levels.
I resorted to a rough but effective measure based on the opinion polls gathered. I assume
that  the  variation  in  a  party's  popularity from the  initial  bargaining  conditions  can  capture  the
variation in its respective exit option, helping us predicting the probability of a cabinet termination.
I thus created a time-varying variable estimating the change of an incumbent's exit option, defined
as the sum of the deviations of the parties' vote shares predicted by opinion polls, from their actual
vote shares they received at the last election. The unit of analysis of my empirical test is thus the
incument party, from a consensual coalition cabinet. Data on elections and parties' vote shares have
been taken from the ParlGov online database. Following these insights, I collected opinion polls
corresponding to questions such as: "If an election were held today, for what party would you vote
for?", from four countries: Austria (1999-2012), Denmark (1999-2012), Italy (2008-2016), and the
Netherlands  (2002-2016),  for  a  total  of  fifty-four  years  of  parliamentary  politics.  Sources  by
country are reported in Appendix C. The raw dataset counted almost 2,500 opinion polls. I have
taken the weekly averages of these serie, using Thursday (the middle of the week) as the modal
category in order to uniform the trends. Excluding caretaker cabinets, my final dataset covers a total
of fifty-six coalition parties suitable for the test.
This popularity change variable can be thought as a crude measure of how the distribution of
advantages and disadvantages among the coalition partners shifts. The more the parties' exit option
changes  with  respect  to  the  initial  conditions  that  made a  government  agreement  possible,  the
higher the likelihood of cabinet termination. An incumbent party leader might choose to cause a
cabinet termination for more than one reason: forecasting an electoral gain, preventing a further
popularity  loss,  or  because  of  a  bargaining  failure;  all  of  these  cases  should  correspond  to
comparatively higher levels of the main variable. It is important to outline the additive nature of this
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measure:  the  more  numerous  the  coalition,  the  higher  its  value  will  be  on  average.  It  seems
reasonable to assume that coalitions composed of several parties are comparatively more likely to
end prematurely; the variable is designed to capture this.
However, the value that the exit option represents for a government party can be understood
only with reference to the termiation value for other coalition partners. For this reason, I paired the
first variable with a second one, called  change of other incumbents' exit option, representing an
aggregate measure of the alteration in the exit option for the remaining incumbents. As for the first
variable, I expect an increase in the turbulence in popularity for the remaining part of the cabinet to
be associated with a greater probability of cabinet termination.
Notwithstanding  the  low  correlation  between  the  two  variables  capturing  the  parties'
popularity change is rather low (Spearman's rho: 0.243), the two measures are very close from a
theoretical point of view. A higher turbulence in a cabinet's popularity shall be captured by both the
variables. For this reason, an interaction term between the two was included in the test. This allows
to observe the independent impact of the two variables.
The ideological dispersion around the government median point was introduced in order to
test H3.2, a fundamental prediction that constitutes the pillar of my valence theory. This measure is
weighted for each party's vote share, in order to control for the voters' ideological distribution. As in
the previous chapter, the data on ideological scores have been taken from the "rile" index, from the
Manifesto Policy Dataset. In this way, I got an estimation of the ideological dispersion around the
heart of the coalition that supports the government. With this variable I expect to capture the effects
of the valence cost on the choice of terminating the coalition: the more parties are ideologically
cohesive  around  the  coalition  government's  median  point,  the  more  costly  will  be  to
opportunistically  terminate  the  cabinet.  On  the  basis  of  my  valence  theory  and  the  empirical
findings offered by the previous chapter, I expect that more ideologically dispersed legislatures will
offer  less  voting  alternatives  for  deluded  voter,  reducing  the  incumbents'  cost  of  ending  the
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government ahead of time.
The proximity measure employed in the previous chapter cannot be employed here, for the
following reason:  the  ideological  position  of  parties  is  varying greatly through time,  and from
election to election. The ideological proximity variable, as defined in Chapter 2, is a static measure,
and very sensitive to shifts in ideological distances at the same time. The main variable of the
previous empirical test cannot thus be emlpoyed.
In order to test H3.3, I have introduced a dummy variable that is meant to control for the
presence of an  elected Head of the State, since I assume this feature to lower the risk of cabinet
termination. Among the countries represented in my dataset, Denmark and the Netherlands show a
non-elected Head of the State,  either a king or a queen. In modern parliamentary democracies,
monarchs are purely representative figures, devoid of any real political power; dissolution powers
are all in the hands of the government. In Austra and Italy, instead, the Head of the State is elected
(by citizens and by the parliament, respectively) and is provided with actual dissolution powers. For
government leaders, the lack of complete dissolution powers should work as a constraint on their
opportunistic actions; for this reason, I expect this variable to show a negative association with the
risk of cabinet termination.
I have then introduced a set of intervening variables, capturing either some features of the
bargaining environment, and institutional effects. The first is the  number of government parties,
taken from the ParlGov online database. This choice is based on the obvious assumption that the
probability of a bargaining failure is positively associated with the number of players. I expect this
variable to capture effectively the complexity of the negotiation. A second covariate is meant to
control  for  the rules  that  charachterize  the decision making process  in  the  coalition.  There are
countries, such as Denmark, in which the prime minister has the power to unilaterally impose her
choices  on other cabinet members,  while in other systems,  such as Austria  and Italy,  in which
unanimity is required for making decisions. For this reason, I introduced a slightly modified version
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of the unanimity variable from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy (CPD) Data Archive
[Strom et al. 2008]: I coded the former as 0, and the latter cases as 2. The Netherlands represent an
intermediate case, on the basis of what Timmermans and Andeweg [2000] reported:
The standing orders of the council  of  ministers provide most  of  the rules that  apply during the
lifetime  of  a  cabinet.  It  spells  out  the  voting  procedures:  by ordinary majority of  all  ministers
present; a second vote in case of a tie and if the tie remains unbroken, the prime minister casts the
deciding vote [:381].
Given this peculiar feature, I coded the Netherlands as 1. I assume unanimity rule to affect the
coalition  bargaining game,  making it  more  costly  to  find an  agreement  on public  policies  and
raising the probability of a bargaining failure. Consequently, I expect the unanimity variable to be
positively associated with the risk of cabinet termination.
Another  important  variable  controls for  the  presence  of  an  investiture  vote for  the
government.  In  some  countries,  such  as  Austria  and  Denmark,  charachterized  by  negative
parliamentarism, the government doesn't need a parliamentary investiture vote to be in charge. In
other systems instead, such as Italy,  the government cannot start the works without the explicit
support of a parliamentary majority. This difference is of fundamental importance: the requirement
of  a  legislative  investiture  is  a  hurdle  that  should  diminish  averaged uration  by causing  some
governments to fail very quickly [King et al. 1990:857]. I have thus coded those countries in which
there is no investiture vote for governments as 0 (Austria and Denmark), and those countries in
which  a  parliamentary  majority  is  needed  as  1  (Italy  and  the  Netherlands).  This,  once  again,
requires an important specification for the Netherlands; following Bergman [1993]:
In the Netherlands, there is a strong norm (a concept that is broader than  the more precise term
'practice') that the preferable outcome of government formation is a majority government. [...] It is
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not required that there must be a vote of  investiture before a government assumes power. On the
other  hand,  the  norm that  the  government  should  be  supported  (and  not  just  tolerated)  by the
parliament is very strong [:57-58].
I expect this variable to be negatively associated with the risk of cabinet termination. If government
leaders are sure from the start to enjoy a clear parliamentary majority, then their coalition will be
comparatively less likely to  terminate ahead of time.  Analogously,  if,  in order to  substitute  the
current cabinet with an alternative one supported by a different coalition, the government needs to
pass through an investiture vote by the parliaments, then the options available for an opportunistic
incumbent  that  wants  to  terminate the cabinet  will  be lower.  I  thus  expect  a  negative  sign for
investiture vote.
I have then introduced two dummy variables in order to control for the coalition type, one
for minority governments, the other for oversized coalitions. I both cases, I expect that deviations
from the minimum winning status to raise the risk of cabinet termination.
The  statistical  model  employed  is  a  semiparametric  survival  regression.  This  model  is
especially useful,  since it  allows me to avoid making unnecessary assumptions on the baseline
hazard of cabinet  termination [Box-Steffensmeier  and Zorn 2001;  Box-Steffensmeier  and Jones
2004]. Given the variable nature of popularity trends, any commonly used probability distribution
might  not  descrive  them efficaciously;  semiparametric  models  allow for  a  flexibility that  other
models cannot grant. Moreover, as it will be shown below, Cox regression outperforms all the main
parametric models.
For this empirical test, I started treating any early cabinet interruption as termination event,
either those that lead to the formation of a new, alternative coalition from the same legislature, and
those that caused the call of an early election. I referred to Parline, the Inter Parliamentary Union
online database on national parliaments, in order to attribute the responsibility of each government
crisis  to  the  right  incumbents.  The  observations  relative  to  the  parties  that  didn't  appear  as
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responsible of the cabinet termination have been treated as censored observations.
Such a test is perfectly in line with the predictions of my formal model: for a government
party, the exit option of a bargaining game can be represented by either a government substitution,
or by the value represented by an anticipated election. The measure of turbulence can predict the
two events altogether. This is due to the fact that the value of both the options is, at least in part,
based  on the  electoral  expectations  of  the  players.  Either  in  the  more  obvious  case  of  a  snap
election,  and in the case of a negotiation over the formation a substitute coalition,  the game is
played by looking at the players' electoral expectations, that determine who wins and who loses.
Subsequently, I repeated the same analysis looking at the early election and cabinet substitution
events, separately. When a government reaches the end of the legislature, the observation is right
censored. The censoring also happens in those more obvious cases in which the opinion polls series
is interrupted before the end of the cabinet could be empirically observed.
The  main  results  are  shown in  Table  3.5.23 The  first  couple  of  empirical  model  represents  an
explanation of the probability of a cabinet termination, either caused by early election calls and
cabinet substitutions.
The estimates of  changes in the exit option of incumbents' popularity showed the expected signs.
The probability of cabinet termination is  higher when the disproportion of electoral advantages
and/or  disadvantages  changes  with  respect  with  the  initial  conditions.  Consequently,  it  can  be
assumed that strong variations in the parties' exit option correspond to a higher probability of a
failure in the negotiation. H3.1 is thus confirmed.
23 Because of the almost perfect multicollinearity between institutional variables and country-fixed effects,
I excluded the latter from the test. The same analyses with country-dummy variables are available in
Appendix E.
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Table 3.5. Cox proportional hazards models of cabinet duration.
Pooled
Model 3.1 Model 3.2
Bargaining environment
Changes in the exit option (party) 0.290 *** (0.097)
0.415 ***
(0.117)
Changes in the exit option (others) 0.161 **(0.076)
0.191 **
(0.076)
Change (party) × Change (others) –0.015 *(0.009)
–0.029 **
(0.012)
Number of government parties 3.236 ***(1.062)
2.342
(1.554)
Ideological dispersion (coalition) 0.308 ***(0.080)
1.306 ***
(0.238)
Ideological dispersion (legislature) –1.249 ***(0.296)
Minority 5.757 ***(1.130)
1.115
(1.594)
Oversized –4.238 *(2.229)
–2.109
(2.725)
Institutional effects
Unanimity 15.418 ***(3.793)
9.542 *
(4.942)
Elected Head of the State –22.793 ***(6.264)
–15.933 *
(8.151)
Investiture vote –10.531 ***(3.274)
–7.683 *
(4.643)
R2
N 3290 3290
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
(continues)
The ideological dispersion around the government median point played a crucial role too.
Its positive impact on the risk of cabinet termination confirms the fundamental prediction of my
valence theory, for which an incumbent's popularity cost of cabinet termination raises together with
its  ideological  proximity  with  other  competitors.  This  parameter  represents  an  additional
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confirmation of the empirical tests from Chapter 2. Additional confirmation came from the addition
of the ideological dispersion of the legislature, that allowed to control for other potential effects that
such a variable can capture. The impact of the ideological dispersion arount the government median
point is still clear and extremely significant.
(continued)
Early elections Cabinet substitutions
Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 Model 3.6
Bargaining environment
Changes in the exit option (party) 0.352 ***
(0.128)
0.448 ***
(0.166)
0.086
(0.248)
0.133
(0.254)
Changes in the exit option (others) 0.277 ***
(0.098)
0.304 ***
(0.104)
–0.410 *
(0.223)
–0.399 *
(0.220)
Change (party) × Change (others) –0.014
(0.011)
–0.027 *
(0.016)
–0.040
(0.034)
–0.044
(0.035)
Number of government parties 7.833 ***
(1.865)
8.202 ***
(3.015)
–12.488
(14544.914)
–15.416
(14852.275)
Ideological dispersion (coalition) 0.823 ***
(0.170)
2.265 ***
(0.384)
0.172
(0.153)
–0.989
(1.305)
Ideological dispersion (legislature) –1.442 ***
(0.312)
1.006
(1.549)
Minority 13.373 ***
(2.505)
10.824 ***
(3.015)
–14.946
(42941.326)
–12.949
(40.227.991)
Oversized –31.147
(5163.445)
–34.863
(8692.987)
3.391
(23146.321)
33.621
(20785.684)
Institutional effects
Unanimity 36.189 *** 
(7.825)
37.843 ***
(9.752)
–43.129
(66527.429)
–46.634
(64694.355)
Elected Head of the State –50.597 ***
(11.644)
–53.589 ***
(14.572)
66.887
(110329.952)
79.370
(109035.987)
Investiture vote –20.116 ***
(4.933)
–18.697 ***
(6.427)
15.328
(49393.665)
22.568
(49166.795)
R2
N 3290 3290 3290 3290
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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The  Head of  the  State coefficient  corroborates  H3.2:  if  the  Head of  the  State  is  not  a
monarch (as in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands), but is an elected politician with actual
political powers (as in Austria and Italy), then the probability of cabinet termination is significantly
lower.  This  suggests  that  when dissolution  powers  are  in  the  hands  of  the  Head of  the  State,
government leaders will not be completely free of timing the end of the government.
The number of government parties show a strong positive association. Its sign, probably the
most unsurprising among all coefficients, confirms the naive prediction that a negotiation between
several parties is comparatively more likely to fail.
The unanimity coefficient captured the "rigidity" in of the decision-making process, telling
us that the more coalition parties parties are subject to bargaining constraints, the harder will be to
find a point of agreement among them. This result is also in line with the most classic works of
public choice theory [Buchanan 1962].
The  negative  sign  of  investiture  vote confirms  us  that  governments  that  need  explicit
parliamentary support are comparatively more enduring than their counterparts. Investiture vote can
also be legitimately assumed to reduce the number of viable coalitions that can be substituted to the
current, reducing the number of options of an opportunistic incumbent.
Finally,  minority governments  are  confirmed  to  increase  the  likelihood  of  cabinet
termination, even while controlling for the Denmark fixed effect. This is hardly surprising, given
that minority governments are by nature more "fragile" than their minimum winning counterparts.
On the contrary, the dummy for oversized did not show the expected results. This might be due to
the scarcity of such cases: in the whole dataset, only one cabinet (the Italian Letta I) was supported
by an oversized coalition.
The  same  analysis  has  been  then  repeated  considering,  as  termination  events,  an  early
election call and a cabinet substitution, separately. Results are shown in Table 3.6. Model 3.3 and
3.4, reporting the results for early election events, confirm all the hypotheses formulated above.
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Cabinet substitution models, instead, didn't fulfil expectations. This is probably due to the small
number of such cases, only five in the dataset. However, the main empirical predictions of my
model result corroborated.
Additionally, Table 3.6 shows how the semiparmetric Cox model, allowing to abstain from
making parametric assumptions on the baseline hazard of event occurrence performed better than its
common parametric counterparts.
Table 3.6. Goodness of fit tests for semiparametric and parametric models.
Models Log-likelihood BIC AIC
Cox (Model 3.1) –125.5289 332.0442 271.0577
Weibull –246.1519 581.3888 516.3037
Exponential –253.8798 596.8447 529.7596
Log-normal –251.5099 592.105 527.0199
However, it  can be argued that from my model, especially by looking at Figure 3.5, it must be
concluded  that  the  risk  of  cabinet  termination  grows as  parties  come closer  to  the  end  of  the
legislature, an assumption that was not embedded in a Cox semiparametric regression. In fact, the
raising hazards of cabinet termination can be graphically observed by looking at Figure 3.9. It thus
seems clear that the probability of cabinet survival lowers as time goes, but that the most common
parametric event history models cannot describe this phenomenon in a satisfactory way.
The results achieved thus confirm the theoretical and empirical robustness of my formal
bargaining model and, more generally, of my valence theory of election timing.
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Figure 3.9. Kaplan-Meier estimates of Model 3.1. 
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a formal theory of cabinet termination in multiparty,
consesual democracies, and to test its implication.
Throughout a legislature, coalition parties in a consensual parliamentary sistem are involved
in a continuous bargainig on public policies.  In every moment,  an incumbent chooses between
keeping  the  cabinet  alive,  together  with  the  negotiation  with  other  coalition  partners,  and
withdrawing from the cabinet. This second choice can lead either to the substitution of the current
coalition with an alternative from the same legislature, or to an early election. The value that a
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cabinet  termination  represents  for  the  parties  can  be  described  as  the  exit  option  of  a  non-
cooperative bargaining game. In such a game, electorally advantaged coalition partners can exploit
their position in order to obtain policy benefits from more disadvantaged incumbents. This puts my
model in line with the past formal literature on election timing [Lupia and Strom 1995; Diermeier
and Stevenson 2000]. These election timing prerogatives, however, come with a cost that can be
described  as  a  negative  shock  in  the  valence  capital  of  the  incumbent  causing  the  cabinet
termination. This assumption constitutes the pillar of my valence theory of election timing that was
exposed in Chapter 2 and developed in my formal model.
The bargaining subgame exposed above can explain how the exit option determines what
policies  are  acceptable  and what  aren't  for  the government  parties  involved.  It  allowed also to
explain why in some cases both parties have interest in keeping the status quo policy intact, while in
others a new negotiation on public policies happens, and when this negotation is doomed to failure
instead. That simple model, combined with the effects of time, described by a series of discrete
steps, describes why the same exit option can produces opposite effects in different periods of the
legislature.  The  inclusion  of  temporal  effects  of  on  coalition  negotiation,  unprecedented  in  the
formal literature of consensual models, was made possible thanks to the quasi-recursive structure of
players' utility, as taken from Kayser [2005].
I then deduced a set of predictions that have been subject to empirical testing using event
history methodology. The results confirmed what expected.  High variations in the exit option of
coalition  parties'  bargaining  on  public  policies  lead  to  a  disequilibrium  in  the  distribution  of
electoral advantages and/or disadvantages, changing the conditions that made an initial coalition
agreement possible, and raising the probability of a negotiation failure. The outcome of the coalition
bargaining  game  is  influenced  by  several  factors,  either  due  to  the  nature  of  the  bargaining
interaction,  and  to  institutional  features  that  change  from country  to  country.  An  ideologically
spread  legislature  provides  deluded  voters  with  a  comparatively  lower  number  of  alternatives,
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making harder for them to punish opportunistic incumbents. My valence theory of election timing
received additional empirical confirmation. The assumption of opportunistic, of self-interested party
leaders  is  made  cleare  by  looking  at  the  dissolution  powers  of  the  Head  of  the  State:  when
dissolution  powers  are  subtracted  to  the  arbitrariness  of  the  prime minister  or  the  incumbents,
cabinets tend, all things equal, to last longer. Moreover, the coalition is more likely to terminate
ahead of time time stronger are the constraints to the incumbent's bargaining. When unanimity is
required  among  government  officials,  the  excessive  rigidity  of  the  game  lowers  the  survival
probability  of  the  government.  Analogously,  the  requirement  of  an  investiture,  by  making
parliamentary support explicit, raises the survival probability of the cabinet, and lowers the number
of potential coalition that an opportunistic incumbent might try to substitute to the current one.
I believe the theoretical insights provided, supported by the empirical evidence, brings a set
of improvements for the literature on election timing. This model of election timing was able to put
together different branches of political science that had never been linked before: it introduced the
role of valence issues in election timing and, more generally, made election timing compatible with
spatial  models  of  policymaking.  Finally,  it  is  the  first  formal  model  in  the  consensual  family
providing an adequate description of the effect of time on incumbent parties' choices, showing how
the same popularity shock in different can lead to completely different outcomes in different times
of the legislature. 
The empirical  side of the present study provided some advancements too:  it  is  the first
empirical test in political science that used time-varying data on voting intentions. Using data on
parties' popularity trends in order to explain the likelihood of cabinet termination, though intuitive,
had never been done before in the literature on election timing.
The empirical test I showed represented an additional confirmation of my valence theory of
election timing. Moreover, it was done using a set of countries that is partially different from the
ones employed in the previous chapter. I argue that empirical corroboration coming from two very
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different datasets make my results even more robust.
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Chapter 4
Coalition bargaining and Ministerial Tenure. A Corollary Analysis.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the bargaining theory reported in Chapter 3 can be
applied, with few corollary assumptions, to the study of ministerial tenure. The bargaining subgame,
as depicted in Figure 3.5, is based on the fundamental concept of exit option, i.e. the value that a
negotiation  failure  represents  for  the  parties  involved.  It  was  showed  how  an  electorally
disadvantaged party could be forced to grant non-electoral benefits to a more advantaged coalitoin
partner, in order to avoid an anticipated cabinet termination. In the previous chapter, these non-
electoral  benefits  have  been  described  as  policy  concessions.  Public  policies,  however,  do  not
exhaust  the  set  of  possible  benefits  that  an electorally advantaged party can  extort  from other
coalition parties. It can also be assumed that the layoff of single ministers, or alterations of their
policy prerogatives, can be thought as an exchange currency in power relations among government
parties. A very unpopular incumbent, in fact, might be forced to have a minister removed from his
or her office, and excluded from the cabinet or transferred to a less relevant ministry. Analogously,
an  electorally  advantaged  party  can  reasonable  expect  to  obtain  an  increase  in  the  policy
prerogatives for its ministers. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that ministers that belong to
popular parties are more "protected" from potential popularity shock. A comparatively weaker party
could be forced by other coalition parties to the minister hit by a scandal.24
24 It is however important to note that the purpose of the present chapter is not estimating the magnitude of
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The studies focusing directly on the duration of ministerial spells, based on event history
methodology, are not many. Berlinski et al. [2007] also highlighted the lack of quantitative studies
in  this  field.  They  analyzed  ministerial  tenure  in  the  United  Kingdom employing  a  series  of
variables capturing features at both the individual and governmental level. It results that British
ministers are more safe from dismissal when they have higher education,25 when they are younger,
and when they have a longer experience. Predictably, ministers of the highest ranks are more stable,
since the dismissal of a very relevant would be a cause of greater turmoil within the incumbent
party. It also appears that women's careers are more stable than men's. In a later research [2010],
Berlinski et al. broadened the enquiry recurring to the occurrence of resignation calls from the main
British newspapers as an explanatory variable of ministerial tenure, finding that resignation calls
increase  the  probability  of  dismissal.  An interesting,  less  obvious  finding is  that  responsibility
seems to be distributed among all the members of the cabinet: a resignation call for one minister
seems to influence the duration of other ministers' tenure.
The only important comparative work that takes into exam the duration of ministerial spells
is offered by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo [2008]. They produced a broad research on ministerial
duration,  employing  data  from  nineteen  countries,  either  Westminster  and  consensuals.  They
analyzed the occurrence of different events: the dismissal of a minister throughout the legislature;
the dismissal of a minister at a cabinet termination; the termination of the cabinet and the survival
of the minister. Since their dataset presents a much greater institutional and governmental variety,
these  effects  must  be  controlled  for.  It  results  that  ministers  are  more  stable  in  coalition
governments, when they belong to larger parties, when they control an important portfolio, and
when the legislature is charachterized by a lower electoral volatility.
Another stream of research investigates the occurrence of cabinet reshuffles in Westminster
the corrective effect of a ministerial resignation, following a popularity shock. For this topic, see Dewan
and Dowding [2005], Dewan and Myatt [2007], Berlinski et al. [2010].
25 In case of the United Kingdom, the most predictive educational variable captures "Oxbridge" education.
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political  systems.  Kam and Indridason [2005]  defined  reshuffles  as  "any change  in  ministerial
personnel  or  responsibilities  that  affects  more  than  two  portfolios"  [:329].  Contemporaneous
changes in ministerial  prerogatives are,  as they argue,  non-independent events;  the dismissal of
single ministers is thus off-topic. Reshuffles in majoritarian systems are explained as a tool that
prime ministers use in order to maintain power by getting rid of potential intra-party competitors
and increasing the chances of winning the elections. When the prime minister's leadership becomes
more precarious, reshuffles become more likely. The risk of cabinet reshuffles is higher when the
prime minister has limited dismissal powers, when the prime minister's popularity declines, and
when the popularity gap between the prime minister's party and other coalition partners shrinks,
putting coalition partners in a stronger bargaining position. A later research [Indridason and Kam
2008] offered one of the very few formal models in the literature, showing how cabinet reshuffles
represent an efficient mechanism for reducing the moral hazard facing ministers.
Other  works,  more  distant  from the  object  of  the  present  chapter,  tried  to  explain  the
probability, for elected politicians, to be selected as ministers by party leaders [Kerby 2009, 2011;
Kam et al. 2010; Back et al. 2016].
All of the researches produced up to now on ministerial tenure share two main limitations.
First,  their  general  lack  of  interest  for  multiparty,  consensual  systems:  amost  any  effort  was
concentrated  on  Westminster  systems,  with  an  outstanding dominance  of  the  United  Kingdom.
Second, all the duration models employed up to now are essentially static tests: they are based on a
collection of data on individual, party, government and polity features. This is analgous to the status
of the literature on election timing, as reviewed in Chapter 1.
The  research  on  ministerial  careers  lacks  also  a  treatment  of  the  effects  of  coalition
bargaining  in  multiparty  consensual  systems,  and  how  the  threat  of  an  anticipated  cabinet
termination can be exploited by electorally advantaged parties in order to rip-off office and policy
andvantages has never been analyzed. Additionally, ministerial duration has never been explained
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using time-varying voting intentions data. The bargaining model exposed in the previous chapter
offers the opportunity to fill this gap. Its insights will be employed for a corollary inquiry on the
determinants of ministerial tenure, and will produce novel, untested assumptions.
Testing the Bargaining Model on Ministerial Tenure
The  fundamental  hypotheses  of  the  presente  chapter  can  be  deduced  starting  from two  main
assumptions: first,  electorally advantaged coalition parties can extort non-electoral benefits from
other  coalition  parties;  second,  the  resignation  of  a  minister,  or  an  alteration  of  his  or  her
prerogatives, can be thought as an exchange currency in coalition power relations. This leads to the
two following hypotheses:
(H4.1) A higher turbulence in the distribution of electoral advantages and/or disadvantages
among  the  members  of  a  governing  coalition  is  associated  with  a  higher  likelihood  of
ministerial termination.
(H4.2) A higher turbulence in the distribution of electoral advantages and/or disadvantages
among the members of a governing coalition is associated with a higher probability of a
reallocation of ministerial prerogatives.
These hypotheses can be easily tested with tools similar  to  the ones employed in the previous
chapter.
92
As a starting point for the empirical test,  I  collected data on 453 ministers from all  the
cabinets analyzed in Chapter 3. These data have then be combined with the relative voting intention
trends. I thus obtained a large dataset, counting almost 20,000 observations.  As in the previous
chapter, I will employ a Cox proportional hazard model, that allows to avoid making assumptions
on the baseline hazard of ministerial tenure. Event history methodology, however, requires a clear
definition of the event that causes the termination of a ministerial office. I will run two separate
tests, based on two different kind of "events". The first is ministerial termination, occurring every
time a minister is removed from office, and no other role is provided untile the termination of the
cabinet. This is the most obvious definition of event for such a methodology, and the basis of some
of the most relevant empirical works [Berlinski et al. 2007, 2010; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo
2008]. The second class of events is labeled power redistribution, and encompasses more than one
case: the termination of a minister, as in the first case; a ministerial reshuffle, in case a minister is
shifted from one ministry to another; an alteration of the policy prerogatives of that minister. This
second definition of event is thus broader, and includes the first. No such events leaves incumbent
parties  indifferent:  each  of  these  cases  counts  as  a  redistribution  of  power  among government
leaders.
When the whole cabinet ends, because of an election or the substitution of the old cabinet
with a newer one, all the observations are trated as censored. This requires a specification: the goal
of the present research is the check whether a change in government parties' electoral expectations
can successfully explain the length of ministerial tenure. The birth of a new cabinet, following an
election or the termination of a previous coalition, is a crucial moment for parliamentary politics
that can determine the career of a minister, but it represents a phenomenon that does not constitute
the point of the present research. For this reason, the removal of a minister, or the alteration of his
or her policy prerogatives at the moment of the birth of a new government are not to be explained.
The unit of analysis is the single minister-cabinet. For this reason, if an individual owns more than
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one ministerial  prerogative,  the observation will  not be split  into two distinct  observations,  but
treated as one.26
The following variables will be included in the test. The main predictor is, once again, the
change in the party's exit option, as operationalized in Chapter 3, to which the change in the exit
option  of  other  coalition  parties is  associated  in  order  to  control  for  the  disequilibrium in the
electoral  expectations  of  the  coalition  as  a  whole.27 This  second  variable  is  of  fundamental
importance, given that the negotiation between government parties is a collective phenomenon, that
cannot be studied by analyzing a single incumbents separately.  The value of the exit option for a
government party can be understood only with reference to the value it represents for other coalition
partners. As in the previous chaper, and on the basis of the insights provided above, I expect the two
change variables to be positively associated to the probability of event occurrence.28
Together with these two variables, I included a series of covariates. The  prime minister's
dismissal powers is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case a prime minister has the
26 The alternative strategy would require  a different  unit  of  analysis:  ministry-cabinet,  or  policy field-
cabinet. I argue this would make the test much harder and controverse: first, it would hadrly describe the
sum of policymaking power in the hands of a single minister holding more than one office; second, the
distinguishing between different policy fields is not as easy as it might seem at first sight.
27 This  methodology  brings  one  inconvenient:  the  introduction  of  the  change variables  exclude,  by
definition, independent ministers from the test. However, I argue this represents a just a minor drawback,
given that independents account for about two percent of the ministers in the dataset.
28 The  same  explanatory  variables  employed  in  Chapter  3  are  used  for  the  present  empirical  tests.
Turbulence in  the  exit  option of  coalition parties  leads  to  a  reallocation of  ministerial  powers,  and,
beyond a certain threshold, to a cabinet termination. In light of this, one might hypothesize a non-linear
association between the main predictor and the probability of event occurrence. However, because of the
methodology employed in the present Chapter, this is not to be expected: minister-cabinet observations
are censored at  the time of a cabinet  termination. This ruled out  the threshold values of the change
variable beyond which a termination of the cabinet is to be expected, instead of its ministers.
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power to remove ministers [Bergman et al. 2003:186-187; Strom et al. 2003]. This variable is thus
coded as 0 for Italy and the Netherlands, and 1 for Denmark and Austria. It seems reasonable to
expect a positive association between this variable and the probability of event occurrence: if the
prime minister has this power, then it will be much easier to remove an "uncomfortable" minister.
The  number of  government  parties is  meant  to  control  for  government  heterogeneity.  A
measure of ideological range based on the Manifesto Policy Dataset was ruled out because of its
very high correlation with other variables.
The number of events happened in the cabinet is included, given the assumption that cabinet
members cannot remove or redistribute ministerial power indefinitely. A coalition can bear a certain
amount of internal turbulence, beyond which parties would opt for a cabinet failure. For this reason,
I assume a negative association between this variable and the event hazard.
A postelection dummy is included on the basis of the following considerations: given that
possible governing coalitions are finite in any given legislature, the postelection status of a cabinet
provides incumbents with more potential alternative coalition that can be substituted to the current
one in case a government crisis happens. A cabinet devoid of this tool might recur to the demotion
of a minister, or to a redistribution of ministerial powers, in order to face the crisis. Consequently,
ministerial tenures should be longer during postelection governments.
A couple of coalition variables, controlling for minority and oversized cabinets, are included.
I assume that deviations from the minimum winning status make cabinets more unstable, and lower
the survival probability of single ministers. A greater number of corrective measures, by incumbent
leaders, might be needed in order to keep the cabinet alive as long as possible. I thus expect a
positive association between these two coalition dummies and the probability of event occurrence.
The variables listed thus far are relative to the bargaining environment in which coalition parties
play their bargaining game. They capture institutional, governmental, and party-level effects, and
are meant to  capture those factors  that  are not attributable to single ministers.  A second set  of
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variables capture the most relevant individual-level features.
The first is a dummy, controlling for the prime minister's party.  I assume that a minister that
belongs  to  the  same  party  of  the  prime  minister  enjoys  a  more  priviledged  status  that  their
counterparts. The grater negotiation power of a prime minister should represent a greater protection
for his or her career.
The  relevance  of  the  portfolio held  by  the  minister  is  of  fundamental  importance.
Information on portfolio relevance was taken from Druckman and Warwick [2005], that constitutes
the source of relevance scores that is temporally closer to the observations at hand. When a minister
controls more that one policy field, the values of the respectiv portfolios have been summed. A
negative association with the probability of ministerial termination is expected, assuming that the
removal of a low rank minister  has a moderate effect on the coalition equilibrium.
Age of the minister is a continuous variable, estimating the number of years of life of the
minister. This variable is computed confronting the birth date of each minister with the dates that
compose the voting intention trends. For this reason, the ministers of the present dataset grow older
as time passes. Gender is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in case the minister is a woman; this
will allow to check whether women are reserved different treatments than men in cabinet offices.
An experienced dummy takes controls for previous ministerial roles in the past fulfilled in the past
by the minister. I assume firing a veteran is more costly, for a party leader, that replacing a novice.
Education controls  for  ministers  with  a  college  degree.  Country-  fixed  effects  could  not  be
introduced for the almost perfect multicollinearity with several variables.
I  run  the  "termination"  and  the  "redistribution  event"  models  more  than  once:  testing
combinations of the change variables, either separately and interacted, in order to control for their
multicollinearity. Results are reported in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1. The effect of party popularity on ministerial duration.
Termination Redistribution
Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4
Bargaining environment
Change in the exit
option (party)
0.573 ***
(0.147)
0.668 ***
(0.162)
0.671 ***
(0.119)
0.739 ***
(0.128)
Change in the exit
option (rest of cabinet)
0.500 ***
(0.162)
0.329 *
(0.187)
0.573 ***
(0.132)
0.455 ***
(0.147)
Change (party) 
× Change (rest)
0.0199 ***
(0.008)
0.014 **
(0.006)
Prime ministers'
dismissal powers
2.312 ***
(0.594)
1.895 ***
(0.532)
2.762 ***
(0.533)
2.303 ***
(0.499)
Number of government
parties
–0.446
(0.717)
–1.159
(0.727)
–0.300
(0.685)
–0.929
(0.711)
Number of events –0.234 ***
(0.061)
–0.256 ***
(0.064)
–0.192 ***
(038)
–0.205 ***
(0.040)
Postelection –0.814 *
(0.429)
–0.618
(0.437)
–1.272 ***
(0.294)
–1.137 ***
(0.302)
Minority 1.880 ***
(0.370)
1.952 ***
(0.368)
2.338 ***
(0.289)
2.396 ***
(0.289)
Oversized 3.413
(2.065)
5.314 **
(2.145)
2.737
(1.951)
4.297 **
(2.037)
Individual minister
Prime minister's party –0.336
(0.299)
–0.749 **
(0.340)
–0.571 ***
(0.242)
–0.857 ***
(0.273)
Portfolio relevance –1.192 ***
(0.334)
–1.225 ***
(0.338)
–1.060 ***
(0.255)
–1.089 ***
(0.258)
Age 0.041 **
(0.017)
0.042 **
(0.017)
0.014
(0.013)
0.015
(0.013)
Gender –0.107
(0.295)
0.017
(0.295)
–0.118
(0.226)
–0.052
(0.227)
Previous experience 0.030
(0.288)
0.130
(0.289)
0.252
(0.223)
0.275
(0.223)
College degree 0.646 *
(0.383)
0.630 *
(0.380)
0.311
(0.270)
0.312
(0.269)
Log-likelihood –439.575 –435.863 –697.968 –695.089
N (spells) 453 453 453 453
N (events) 57 57 93 93
N (observations) 19900 19900 19900 19900
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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The coefficient corresponding to the change in the party's exit option is significant and of
the expected sign. This confirms us that the more the exit option of a party changes, with respect to
the conditions at  the beginning of the legislature that made the cabinet possible,  the higher the
probability to observe a disequilibrium of power among coalition parties, both in the form of a
ministerial removal, or the broader case of a reallocation of policymaking prerogatives. The same
conclusions are backed by the change coefficient corresponding to other government parties, but its
significance is weakened by the high multicollinearity with the main variable. These results are
however perfectly in line with the  predictions from the empirical test in Chapter 3.
Prime minister's dismissal power is one of the strongest and most significant effects in all
the models reported. Its sign tells us that a prime minister provided with stronger dismissal and
removal powers will use this power instrumentally. When the head of the cabinet can remove a
minister  unilaterally,  ministerial  tenures  are  significantly  more  uncertain.  The  number  of
government parties didn't reach statistical significance in any of the models provided. The same
results have been reached by other measures of coalition heterogeneity, such as ideological range
based  on  the  Manifesto  Policy  Dataset  (which  was  excluded  because  of  its  excessive
multicollinearity with other  covariates).  It  seems that  bargaining  variables  outperform the  ones
capturing ideological distance.  The  number of  events fulfills  expectations:  the occurrence of an
alteration of ministerial prerogatives becomes less likely each time such an event happens. The
postelection coefficient  corroborates  the  assumption  that  a  layoff  or  a  change  in  ministerial
prerogatives is a tool for handling government crises that becomes more useful when other options,
such as a cabinet substitution, are not available for incumbent parties.
The  minority status of a government coalition is a very strong predictor, suggesting that
structurally unstable governments must resort to changing the allocation of ministerial prerogatives
as a correcting measure in order to grant the survival of the cabinet.  The  oversized coefficient
reached similar conclusions, but its impact is much less significant. Oversized coalitions seem to
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lead to governing agreements on the allocation of policymaking prerogatives that are harder to
modify throughout the course of the legislature, granting a greater stability of ministerial tenures
Among the individual-level variables, the dummy corresponding to the prime minister's party is one
of the strongest effects. This tells us that ministers from the same party of the head of the cabinet
are protected by the greater bargaining powers that office grants. The relevance of the portfolio is
another of the strongest effects, and its effect is unquestionably clear: firing the minister of turism is
not like firing the minister defense. The removal of important ministers is comparatively harder,
since it would represent a great shock for the stability of the cabinet. Other individual variables do
not show particularly significant impacts on the dependent variable. Age and college degree have an
impact only in termination models. Older and more educated ministers seem to be more likely to be
fired from their  office,  but their  significance disappears when a broader definiton of "event" is
employed. In the end, it doesn't seem that demographics played an imporant empirical role.
Party Popularity and Ministerial Tenure
The previous paragraph, as well as the empirical tests in Chapter 3, were based on a measure of the
change in the parties' exit option, which was operationalized as an absolute difference between the
vote shares at the last election, and the opinion polls' predictions throughout the legislature. At this
point, it is of some interest to check how the variation in parties' popularity associates with the
length of ministerial tenures. According to the the bargaining model reported herein, an impopular
party  is  more  likely  to  be  forced  to  make  concessions  to  other  parties,  such  as  accepting  a
redistribution  of  policymaking  powers,  or  to  remove  a  minister  from  office.  The  following
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hypotheses can thus be formally expressed.
(H4.3)  Increasingly  unpopular  parties  are  more  likely  to  be  forced  to  fire  individual
ministers.
(H4.4) Increasingly unpopular parties are more likely to be forced to accept reallocation of
policymaking prerogatives.
At  this  point,  I  have  repeated  the  previous  test  on  the  same data,  but  substituting  the  change
variables with alternative ones. The first, and most important, is a party's popularity drift, calculated
as a difference between initial vote shares and the opinion polls' predicted shares, this time not in
absolute value. This variable assumes a negative sign when the party is less popular with respect of
the beginning of the legislature, and a positive sign when opinion polls predict a higher vote share. I
expect that the more a party is unpopular, the weaker it will be in the coalition bargaining game. A
weak  party  might  be  forced  to  fire  a  minister,  or  to  accept  a  reallocation  of  policymaking
prerogatives in the cabinet.
I then added a second variabile that is analogous, but not identical to the ones previously
employed, called  change in the coalition's exit  option,  that corresponds to a change variable as
specified  above,  but  computed  on the  whole  government  coalition.  The  motivation  behind the
introduction  of  this  variable  is  that  the  choice  of  a  party  to  fire  a  minister,  or  to  review the
distribution of ministerial prerogatives, does not depend from that party alone. When the turbulence
in popularity for the whole cabinet raises, it must be expected that more coalition members will ask
for a reallocation of policymaking powers. In such cases, the pressure on unpopular parties for
portfolio concessions shall increase. 
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Table 4.2. The effect of party popularity on ministerial duration.
Termination Redistribution
Model 4.5 Model 4.6 Model 4.7 Model 4.8
Bargaining environment
Party's popularity drift –0.082 *
(0.046)
–0.348 ***
(0.064)
–0.119 ***
(0.040)
–0.351 ***
(0.052)
Change in the exit 
option (coalition)
0.005
(0.037)
0.118 ***
(0.034)
0.021
(0.035)
0.139 ***
(0.029)
Party's popularity drift
× Change (coalition)
0.017 ***
(0.003)
0.017 ***
(0.003)
Prime ministers'
dismissal powers
1.896 ***
(0.650)
1.564 ***
(0.496)
2.649 ***
(0.631)
1.923 ***
(0.445)
Number of 
government parties
–0.478
(0.699)
–1.631 **
(0.714)
–0.151
(0.678)
–1.506 **
(0.686)
Number of events –0.233 ***
(0.063)
–0.304 ***
(0.071)
–0.179 ***
(0.038)
–0.225 ***
(0.043)
Postelection –0.777 *
(0.434)
–0.348
(0.455)
–1.283 ***
(0.298)
–0.944 ***
(0.310)
Minority 1.621 ***
(0.367)
1.628 ***
(0.364)
2.101 ***
(0.287)
2.136 ***
(0.284)
Oversized 4.267 **
(2.107)
6.024 ***
(2.157)
3.291 *
(1.987)
5.120 **
(1.995)
Individual minister
Prime minister's party –0.192
(0.295)
–0.860 **
(0.333)
–0.406 ***
(0.236)
–1.040 ***
(0.267)
Portfolio relevance –1.060 ***
(0.326)
–1.024 ***
(0.331)
–0.944 ***
(0.248)
–0.949 ***
(0.255)
Age 0.041 **
(0.017)
0.040 **
(0.016)
0.013
(0.013)
0.016
(0.012)
Gender –0.027
(0.301)
0.181
(0.303)
–0.049
(0.231)
0.093
(0.231)
Previous experience –0.012
(0.287)
0.071
(0.294)
0.134
(0.223)
0.193
(0.225)
College degree 0.698 *
(0.381)
0.589
(0.379)
0.350
(0.269)
0.297
(0.267)
Log-likelihood –446.274 –430.767 –708.382 –687.100
N (spells) 453 453 453 453
N (events) 49 49 82 82
N (observations) 19900 19900 19900 19900
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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I expect higher values of this variable to correspond to a shorter length of the ministerial
teure, and to a higher probability of power redistribution among cabinet members. Given that both
the variables introduced are based on how parties' popularity changes, I added an interacton term to
the test, in order to control for their mutual influence.
As shown in Table 4.2, the hypotheses are confirmed: unpopular parties are more likely to
make concessions to other coalition partnes, and large variations of the exit option of a coalition
negotiation correspond to greater concessions from unpopular parties. 
The two main variables fulfilled expectations either when tested independently, and after
controlling for reciprocal influence. All other variables confirm what found up to now.
A minister has higher probability of keeping office and prerogative when the prime minister doesn't
own strong dismissal powers, when the government is a direct outcome of general elections, and at
its most stable status (minimum winning), when he or she belongs to the prime minister's party, and
when owns a very relevant portfolio position. The number of government parties is not significant.
This seems to be due to the combination of the main variable, that already capture the litigiosity of
the coalition. Gender, previous experience and degree are not significant, or very weakly significant
on  the  whole,  and  don't  allow to  reach  any grounded  generalization.  Age seems  to  affect  the
likelihood of demotions alone.
These  empirical  tests  added  new  explanations  of  ministerial  duration  to  the  literature.
Moreover, it brought further evidence in favor of the formal model presented in Chapter 3, showing
how the variation in the allocation of ministerial prerogatives can be thought as a currency between
coalition parties, who negotiate on policy outcomes on the basis of their electoral expectations.
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Conclusions
The conclusions taken from the formal model reported in the previous chapter have been extended
in order to link the study of coalition bargaining with the literature on ministerial tenure. I employed
survival  analysis  techniques  with  time-varying  covariates  using  voting  intention  trends,  and
explained the probability of ministerial termination on the basis of the variations in the exit option
of a bargaining game between coalition parties.
Large shifts in the incumbents'  exit option are associated with a greater probability of a
ministerial layoff, and of a redistribution of policymaking prerogatives within the cabinet members.
These events are more probable when the prime minister owns greater dismissal powers, when a
minister doesn't belong to the prime minister's party, when he or she holds important portfolios, and
when few alteration of ministerial prerogatives already occurred. Moreover, they tend to happen
more frequently in case of those postelection coalitions that deviate from the minimum winning
status, especially in case of minority governments. The dismissal of a minister or an alteration of his
or her prerogatives seems thus to have a corrective effect, to which parties can recur in order to
prolong the duration of the cabinet.
It  seems  that,  in  order  to  explain  ministerial  tenure,  demographics  do  not  count  for
consensual coalition governments, where ministerial duration is the outcome of a negotiation within
multiparty  cabinets.  Previous  researches  showed  their  relevance,  based  on  evidence  from
(completely, or at least partially) Westminster systems, where the prime minister can terminate a
ministerial career without any obstacle, and the coalition dynamics analyzed here are not at play.
This  might  represent  a  significant  discovery regarding  the  differences  between  consensual  and
majoritarian systems.
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Concluding Remarks
The opportunistic timing of elections is one of the most fundamental phenomena in the life of
parliamentary political systems. The present thesis was an attempt to deepen our knowledge of it;
what follows is a list of its main findings.
I started proposing a new valence theory of election timing, describing the popularity toll of
manipulative election timing as negative shock in the valence capital of an incumbent. Since the
variations  in  the  Stokes  region change as  the  ideological  distance  between adjacent  competitor
changes, spatial proximity among parties became the main predictor of this cost. The new valence
theory sketched in Chapter 2 is able to describe variations in this popularity toll. This explanation is
simpler and alternative to the Bayesian hypothesis of Smith [2004], assuming voters to interpret
election calling as a signal of a future economic downturn, which is admittedly controverse.
Moreover, my research provided a solution to an ongoing debate in the field on the magnitude of
the popularity cost of calling a snap election. A case study of the 2000 Canadian election showed
why Blais et al. [2004] didn't find evidence of this cost, whil Smith did [2003, 2004]. With the first
comparative test ever produced on the topic I showed that their conclusions are just specific cases of
a general phenomenon. This represents the potential solution of a debate that was open from at least
fourteen years.
Later,  I  presented  a  bargaining model  of  election  timing,  in  which  I  modeled  coalition
parties' negotiations on public policies. Coalition government was described as charachterized by a
continuous negotiation on public policies among parties, with the outcome of this game depending
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from the electoral expectations of the players. Any time a party can call a snap election, paying a
valence cost, or extorting  concessions from other coalition partners in case they are electorally
advantaged. The game was not of a static type, as for other multiparty models: I introduced time
and showed its effects on the outcome of the negotiation. On the empirical side, I produced the first
survival model of cabinet termination with time-varying measures based on voting intention trends.
I was able to show how measured of the change in parties'  exit option successfully capture the
probability of anticipated cabinet termination.
Once the model was tested, I applied its main insights on a corollary research on the length
of ministerial  tenure.  Even in this case, a duration model with time-varying measures based on
opinion polls was run for the first time in the respective literature. Results supported the thesis that
the dismissal of a minister, or the alteration of his or her policymaking powers, can be explained as
a currency in a coalition bargaining game.
I believe that linking the topic of opportunistic election timing to valence models of party
competition represents the most significant contribution of the present thesis. But there is still much
to be understood. Formal theories of election timing shall be assimilated, through the application of
valence models, into larger theories of party competition being able to account for other phenomena
that have remained theoretically isolated up to now, such as the strategic location of the candidates,
or policymaking.
I hope my contributions might push towards a greater and greater integration of the literature
of election timing with other and new branches of the political science research.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Demonstration of formula (2.2).
With reference to the two-party model from Figure 2.1, and given the voters' utility functions as
defined by equation (2.2).
In order to derive the formula (2.2), the cutoff point between A and B must be found first.
This can be done by finding the meeting point of the two utility curves represented in Figure 2.2,
equating:
−(A−x)2+νA=−(B−x)
2+νB ,
where A and B represent the two parties' ideal points, respectively.
The equation solves:
(A−x)2−νA=(B−x)
2−νB ,
A2−2 Ax+x2−νA=B
2−2 Bx+x2−νB ,
2 Bx−2Ax=B2−A2−νB+νA ,
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2 x(B−A)=B2−A2−νB+νA ,
x=
B2−A2−νB+νA
2(B−A)
.
This formula individuates  the cutoff,  or indifference point between candidates A and B.
Following the proximity voting assumption,  all  the voters on the left  of the cutoff point prefer
candidate A, while all the voters on the right of the cutoff point prefer candidate B.
At this point, let us hypothesize, for candiate A, a negative shock in her valence capital of
magnitude ϵ=(νA−νA) ,  where νA represents  A's  valence  level  before  the  cost,  and νA
represents valence capital after the cost. A valence shock, alterating the position of the cutoff point,
allows us to calculate the width of the variation of the Stokes region (the black segments in Figures
[] and []), in the following way:
ΔA=
B2−A2−νB+νA
2(B−A)
−
B2−A2−νB+νA
2(B−A)
,
which solves:
ΔA=
B2−A2−νB+νA−B
2+A2+νB−νA
2(B−A)
,
ΔA=
νA−νA
2(B−A) .
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Recalling that ϵ=(νA−νA) , the last equation can be rewritten as formula (2.2).
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Appendix B. Structure of the dataset for Chapter 2.
Table B.1. Structure of the dataset for Chapter 1.
Country Election Parties included
Australia
1987
1990
1993
1996
1998
2004
2007
2010
2013
ALP
ALP
ALP
ALP
LPA, NPA
LPA, NPA
LPA, NPA
ALP
ALP
Austria
1995
2002
2006
2008
SPO, OVP
FPO, OVP
FPO, OVP
SPO, OVP
Canada
2000
2004
2006
2008
LPC
LPC
LPC
CPC
Denmark
2001
2005
2007
SD, RV
V, KF
V, KF
Finland 2011 * KOK, KESK, VIHR
Germany 2005 SPD, B90
Ireland
1977 *
1981 *
1982 *
1992 *
1997
2007
2011
ILAB, FG
FF
FF
FF, PD
DL, ILAB, FG
FF
FF
Portugal 2005 *2011
CDS, SDPP
PSP
Spain
2000
2004
2008
2015
PP
PP
PSOE
PP
United Kingdom 1950
1951
1955
1959
1964
1966
1970
LAB
CON
CON
CON
CON
LAB
LAB
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1974-02
1974-10
1979
1983
1987
1992
1997
2001
2005
2010
2015
CON
LAB
LAB
CON
CON
CON
CON
LAB
LAB
LAB
CON, LD
*: only available for Model 2.2.
Table B.2. Party codes.
Country Code Party name
Australia
ALP
LPA
NPA
Australian Labour Party
Liberal Party of Australia
National Party of Australia
Austria
SPO
OVP
FPO
Social Democratic Party of Austria
Austrian People's Party
Freedom Party of Austria
Canada LPCCPC
Liberal Party of Canada
Conservative Party of Canada
Denmark
SD
RV
V
KF
Social Democratic Party
Radical Left
Liberals (Venstre)
Conservative People's Party
Finland
KOK
KESK
VIHR
National Coalition Party
Centre Party
Green League
Germany SPDB90
Social Democratic Party
Greens
Ireland
FF
FG
ILAB
PD
DL
Soldiers of Destiny (Fianna Fail)
Family of the Irish (Fine Gael)
Irish Labour Party
Progressive Democrats
Demcoratic Left
Italy
PD
NCD
SC
UDC
PDL
LN
Democratic Party
New Center-Right
Civic Choice
Union of Center Democrats
The Peopole of Freedom
Northern League
Netherlands CDA
LPF
Christian Democratic Appeal
Pim Fortuyn List
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VVD
D66
PvdA
CU
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
Democrats 66
Labour Party
Christian Union
Portugal
PSP
CDS
SDPP
Socialist Party
Democratic and Social Center
Social Democratic Party
Spain PPPSOE
Popular Party
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
United Kingdom
LAB
CON
LD
Labour
Conservatives
Lib-dems
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Appendix C. Opinion Polls Sources.
Australia
• The Roy Morgan Research website (http://www.roymorgan.com).
More specifically, the Primary Voting Intention Long-Term Trend:
http://www.roymorgan.com/morganpoll/federal-voting/primary-voting-intention-trend-
1901-2016
• The Australian's website (http://www.theaustralian.com.au), Australian newspaper published
since 1964.
More specifically, an opinion poll archive can be accessed at: 
http://polling.newspoll.com.au.tmp.anchor.net.au/cgi-bin/polling/display_poll_data.pl
Austria
• Opinion polls series have been kindly provided by Francesco Zucchini.
Canada
• Laurier Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and Policy: 
http://portal.lispop.ca/index.html
• Elections website, administered by Andrew Heard, Simon Fraser University: 
https://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/elections/index.htm
• National Post's 2015 poll tracker:
(http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canadian-election-2015-poll-tracker)
Denmark
• Gallup Denmark's website (http://gallup.dk).
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More specifically, the Political Index at: http://gallup.dk/statistik/politisk-index
Germany
• http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm
Ireland
• IOPA (Irish Opinion Poll Archive):
(http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/IOPA/)
Italy
• "Sondaggipoliticoelettorali", an Italian Government's website that collects politically 
relevant opinion polls (http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it).
Netherlands
• Peil.nl (pollster):
(https://home.noties.nl/peil/)
• Dutch opinion polls database:
(https://www.allepeilingen.com)
Portugal
• Grupo Marktest website: (http://www.marktest.com/wap/).
More specifically: (http://www.marktest.com/wap/a/p/id~112.aspx).
Spain
• Datos Politicos website: (http://datospoliticos.com/intenciones/1)
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• Single opinion polls were accessed at the following pollsters' websites
◦ January 16, 2004:
(https://web.archive.org/web/20050924172746/http://www.cadenaser.com/static/pulsom
etro/anteriores/encuesta_040119.htm)
◦ December 26, 2007:
(http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/graficos/dic/s4/macroencuesta.html)
◦ December 22, 2007:
(http://www.expansion.com/2007/12/22/economia-politica/politica/1071615.html)
◦ December 17, 2007:
(https://web.archive.org/web/20071217145255/http://www2.elplural.com/politica/detail.
php?id=16287)
◦ October 2, 2015:
(http://www.publico.es/politica/subidon-ciudadanos-27-s-acerca.html)
◦ September 28, 2015:
(https://web.archive.org/web/20150930191548/http://www.tnsglobal.es/press-release/el-
pp-aventaja-en-7-puntos-al-psoe-en-expectativas-de-voto-poco-más-de-3-meses-de-las-)
United Kingdom
• PollBase: an opinion poll database built by Mark Pack: 
https://www.markpack.org.uk/opinion-polls/
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Appendix D.  Structure of the Dataset on Cabinet Durability.
Table D.1. Cabinets and termination dates for Chapter 3.
Country Cabinet Coalition Date Start
(YYY-MM-DD)
Termination Event
(YYY-MM-DD)
Austria
Vranitzky IV
Vranitzky V
Klima I
Schuessel I
Schuessel III
Schuessel IV
Gusenbauer
Faymann I
SPO, OVP
SPO, OVP
SPO, OVP
OVP, FPO
OVP, FPO
OVP, BZO
SPO, OVP
SPO, OVP
1994-11-29
1996-03-12
1997-01-28
2000-02-04
2003-02-28
2005-04-05
2007-01-11
2008-12-02
1995-10-13
1997-01-18
(censored obs.)
2002-09-09
2005-04-04
2006-07-14
2008-07-07
(censored obs.)
Denmark
Rasmussen N IV
Rasmussen F I
Rasmussen F II
Rasmussen F III
Rasmussen L I
Thorning-Schmidt I
SD, RV
V, FK
V, KF
V, KF
V, KF
SD, RV, SF
1998-03-11
2001-11-27
2005-02-18
2007-11-23
2009-04-05
2011-10-02
2001-10-31
2005-01-18
2007-10-24
2009-04-04
2011-08-11
(censored obs.)
Italy
Berlusconi IV
Letta I
Letta II
Renzi
PDL, LN
PD, PDL, SC, UDC
PD, NCD, SC, UDC
PD, NCD, SC, UDC
2008-05-08
2013-04-27
2013-11-18
2014-02-22
2011-11-08
2013-11-18
2014-02-22
(censored obs.)
Netherlands
Balkenende I
Balkenende III
Balkenende V
Rutte I
Rutte III
CDA, LPF, VVD
CDA, VVD, D66
CDA, PvdA, CU
VVD, CDA
VVD, PvdA
2002-05-15
2006-11-22
2007-02-22
2010-10-14
2012-11-15
2002-10-16
2006-07-05
2007-02-22
2012-04-23
(censored obs.)
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Appendix E. Duration Models of Cabinet Durability with Country-Fixed Effects
Table E.1. Cabinet duration models with country-fixed effects.
Pooled Early election Substitution
Model B.1 Model B.2 Model B.3 Model B.4 Model B.5 Model B.6
Bargaining environment
Changes in the exit
option (party)
0.290 ***
(0.097)
0.415 ***
(0.117)
0.352 ***
(0.128)
0.448 ***
(0.166)
0.086
(0.248)
0.133
(0.254)
Changes in the exit
option (others)
0.161 **
(0.076)
0.191 **
(0.076)
0.277 ***
(0.098)
0.304 ***
(0.104)
-0.410 *
(0.223)
-0.399 *
0.220
Change (party)
× Change (others)
-0.015 *
(0.009)
-0.029 **
(0.012)
-0.014 ***
(0.011)
-0.027 *
(0.016)
-0.040
(0.034)
-0.044
(0.034)
Number of
government parties
3.236 ***
(1.062)
2.342
(1.558)
7.833 ***
(1.865)
8.202 ***
(2.499)
-12.488
(0.003e-3)
-15.416
(14852.208)
Ideological dispersion
(coalition)
 0.309 ***
(0.080)
1.306 ***
(0.238)
0.823 ***
(0.170)
2.265 ***
(0.384)
-0.172
(0.153)
-0.989
(1.305)
Ideological dispersion
(legislature)
-1.249 ***
(0.296)
-1.442 ***
(0.312)
1.006
(1.549)
Minority 5.757 ***(1.130)
1.115
(1.594)
13.373 ***
(2.505)
10.824 ***
(3.015)
-16.946
(0.004e-5)
-12.949
(20785.520)
Oversized -4.237 *(2.229)
-2.109
(2.725)
-31.147
(5136.445)
-34.863
(8692.987)
33.391
(3.175e14)
33.621
(20785.520)
Country effects
Austria 3.856 ***(1.026)
1.292
(1.596)
5.709 ***
(1.211)
2.951 *
(1.580)
8.430
(4582.569)
10.167
(12294.846)
Denmark -4.887 **(1.984)
-1.858
(2.496)
-16.073 ***
(3.961)
-19.146 ***
(5.249)
27.802
(1.186e12)
24.066
(42050.830)
Italy -6.675 **(2.667)
-6.391 *
(3.472)
-14.408 ***
(4.049)
-15.746 ***
(5.235)
23.758
(2.079e10)
32.736
(50677.055)
Likelihood-ratio test 52.16 67.34 91.78 114.2 16.8 17.26
Number of events 22 22 17 17 5 5
N 3290 3290 3290 3290 3290 3290
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix F. Parametric Models of Cabinet Durability
Table F.1. Parametric Versions of Model 3.1.
Model F.1
(Weibull)
Model F.2
(Exponential)
Model F.3
(Log-normal)
Bargaining environment
Changes in the exit option (party) -0.135
(-3.02)
-0.263
(-3.10)
-0.173
(-2.74)
Changes in the exit option (others) -0.071
(-2.05)
-0.143
(-1.99)
-0.085
(-1.96)
Change (party) × Change (others) 0.007
(1.69)
0.013
(1.58)
 0.411
(2.57)
Number of government parties -1.110
(-2.35)
-1.791
(-2.05)
-1.378
(-2.37)
Ideological dispersion (coalition) -0.090
(-3.16)
-0.138
(-2.48)
-0.088
(-2.56)
Minority -2.096
(-5.33)
-3.157
(-4.06)
-2.313
(-4.22)
Oversized 1.365
(1.46)
2.817
(1.50)
0.962
(0.83)
Institutional effects
Unanimity -5.073
(-3.73)
-7.517
(-2.85)
-6.115
(-3.46)
Elected Head of the State 7.235
(2.98)
10.708
(2.26)
9.158
(2.93)
Investiture vote 3.872
(2.64)
6.344
(2.29)
5.077
(2.74)
Intercept 15.720(9.16)
22.162
(7.72)
17.921
(8.279)
Nuber of events 22 22 22
N 3290 3290 3290
* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
Note: Z-tests in parentheses.
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